“The world has entered a period of instability, where everything is collapsing and falling apart. We will endure only through unity—and the sooner we recognize this and embrace our shared foundation in the joy of the Resurrection, the more people we will save from destruction.”
Volodymyr Volkovskyi, PhD in Philosophy, Research Fellow at the H.S. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy
At first glance, the issue of relations between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), and the prospects of dialogue between them, may seem like an internal concern—one that pertains only to the faithful. In a secularizing world, intra-Orthodox quarrels might appear to occupy the 120th spot in global interest. But then came Trump, embodying a strongly religious segment of American society, and religious convictions—indeed, even religious myths—shifted from being the butt of social media sarcasm to a driving force in global politics. Ignoring this issue could literally cost lives—if, for example, U.S. leaders, misled by religious disinformation, decide to cut all aid to Ukraine. What once were our usual intra-Orthodox squabbles have thus become dangerously consequential.
On April 9, a webinar titled “Myths and Prejudices Hindering the Unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy” was organized by the Sophia Brotherhood—a community of believers from both the UOC and OCU, interested in dialogue and reconciliation. Thanks to organizer Tetyana Derkach, a representative and well-balanced group of speakers was brought together from both sides. The conversation quickly evolved into a dynamic and candid discussion. Let us reflect on what this means for each of us.
The full recording of the discussion is available on the Sophia Brotherhood’s YouTube channel (Parts 1 and 2). I won’t summarize or spoil the presentations, as the program and speeches are publicly accessible. These include the opening remarks by Tetyana Derkach; a phenomenological analysis of religious consciousness and myth by Hennadii Khrystokin; a clear articulation of what dialogue can and cannot be by Tetyana Kalenychenko; a more radical UOC perspective from Serhii Bortnyk; an overview of how Ukrainian church conflict looks from the perspective of the Conference of European Churches (Natalia Vasylevych); a view from American conservatives and the mythologized notion of “freedom of conscience” by Fr. Kyrylo Hovorun; a profound theological reflection on true Orthodox identity by Yurii Chornomorets; and an analysis of myths and online discourse in social media groups linked to both the UOC and OCU by Fr. Serhii Prokopchuk.
The Central Question: Is Dialogue Between the OCU and UOC Possible?
As presented by the speakers, the issue can be divided into three key components:
- Myths and propaganda
- Dialogue: its parameters and principles
- A shared foundation: the Church and Orthodoxy
Let’s explore these briefly.
Dialogue is not optional—it is a matter of survival.
The long-standing “affectionate” quarrels between the Ukrainian churches, ongoing for over 30 years, have become dangerously habitual. Church representatives have grown so used to these conflicts that many cannot imagine ecclesial life without them. Yet these “cozy feuds” now threaten to undermine the Church’s credibility in a society where younger generations struggle to comprehend the beauty of such outdated battles among bearded hierarchs. As Natalia Vasylevych noted, many church identities are now formed in direct opposition to one another: “everything the UOC says relates to the OCU, and vice versa.” Dialogue is absent, but discursive entanglement persists.
The identities of the churches are often constructed through negation:
- “We are not Moscow/Ukraine,”
- “We are canonical/not schismatic,”
- “We are spiritual/not political,”
- “We are traditional—not a project of Stalin, Putin, Poroshenko, or Biden.”
This dynamic resembles the Russian saying: “quarrelsome lovers bicker to amuse themselves”—except today, religion has re-entered political agendas in the West, which makes the game far riskier.
Myths: What Is Our Orthodoxy, Really?
Speaking of religion and myth—especially “debunking myths”—often leads to an awkward situation. As Hennadii Khrystokin and later Serhii Bortnyk rightly noted, religious consciousness is deeply tied to myth—not as fantasy, but as symbolic narrative or metanarrative. “Myth” (from the Greek mythos) is a meaningful story or worldview framework.
In common usage, myth is contrasted with “objective reality” or “facts.” But in religious and philosophical terms, even “objectivity” is questioned. Religion, as a sacred narrative, shares epistemological space with other “big stories” like science, politics, and ideology. Postmodern thinkers such as Jean-François Lyotard and Michel Foucault revealed how even science is a metanarrative, shaped by power structures and assumptions. So when someone says, “I don’t believe in God, I believe in science,” a seasoned philosopher might smile wryly and think of soap and razors—both tools, both useful, but not the same.
The point: when we claim to oppose “subjective myths” with “objective truths,” we must also ask—what constitutes objectivity?
Still, not all narratives are equal. Following a phenomenological approach, as Khrystokin proposed, we can embrace the principle of intersubjectivity—a shared recognition of truths within a specific community. For Orthodox Christians, this shared horizon is the Orthodox faith as explicitly articulated in Orthodox teaching. This enables us to discern which narratives are closer to Orthodox theology and which are far removed from it.
Which raises the real and painful question: what exactly is Orthodox?
As Yurii Chornomorets argued, modern Orthodox theology has moved well beyond the narrow ideologies of the 19th–20th centuries. It critiques both Russian religious philosophy (heavily influenced by German idealism) and 20th-century Russian theology and neo-patristics (from Georges Florovsky to Greek theologians of the 1960s–70s), which constructed an artificial image of a unified Orthodox tradition.
In fact, the true centers of contemporary Orthodox theology today are the United States and Greece—not Russia or its mythic “Holy Rus.” This applies to both conservative and liberal theological strands.
Chornomorets emphasized a critical idea: rethinking the Church.
The Church is not a power structure, not a “state within a state,” not a partner in political symphony. It is not merely a hierarchy. The Church is, at its core, an eschatological reality rooted in community, Eucharist, and personal spiritual life. The true challenge for the Church is whether it produces radically different human relationships than those outside of it. If it does not—then what does it have to offer the world?
The role of hierarchy, then, must also change.
It is no longer to dominate or “lord over” the people, but to serve unity. Bishops must now become communicators, facilitators, and networkers—not just preachers or bureaucrats. In today’s world, theological authority is not conferred by an episcopal staff but by personal depth and credibility.
Reclaiming Orthodox Theology from Myth
Thoughtful engagement with Orthodox theology leads to a radical re-evaluation of many entrenched assumptions. A large number of beliefs held by Orthodox faithful today are not merely myths—they are destructive and un-Orthodox myths. These include:
- the myth of “canonical legitimacy” as a substitute for spiritual vitality;
- political myths masked as theology;
- cults of saints with questionable theological grounding;
- and deeply rooted stereotypes incompatible with authentic Orthodox teaching.
If reconciliation is to happen, it must begin here: in truth, in shared recognition of faith, and in the courage to let go of the myths that divide us.
Moscow Orthodoxy—and the UOC as part of the same informational field, as noted by Fr. Serhii Prokopchuk—offers many examples of unorthodox myths. The list is extensive: stereotypes about liturgical language (often to the point of outright Ukrainophobia); a distorted concept of “canonicity”; a blatantly heretical attitude toward the sacraments of the OCU (and formerly the UOC-KP), which even contradicts the Moscow Patriarchate’s own stance toward ROCOR and the Old Believers—not to mention Catholics. There is also the cult of Holy Rus’ and the so-called “Russian Church,” which equates Orthodoxy with “Holy-Russianness,” anti-Westernism, anti-liberalism, monarchism, and so on. It would be comical if it weren’t so tragic. In Ukraine, the ROC uses the language of “apoliticism,” “freedom of conscience,” “persecution,” and “non-worldliness of the Church,” while in Russia the ROC has fully merged with the state, supports the suppression of religious freedom for others, and eagerly fulfills the Kremlin’s agenda of “spiritual-patriotic education” and national security.
According to Fr. Serhii Bortnyk, we must acknowledge that certain groups genuinely hold these beliefs and revere their authorities. Moreover, many faithful have sincerely experienced spiritual growth within their church. However, we cannot limit ourselves to a postmodern, uncritical stance of “Group A believes X, and Group B believes Y.” If we are Orthodox, we must say: “With all due respect, dear people, some of these beliefs are simply unorthodox—and even self-contradictory.”
To put it more bluntly: the clash between such beliefs and national law or security is only half the problem. The bigger issue is that these beliefs contradict themselves and betray the very heart of Orthodoxy. The real concern is not whether these ideas are “un-Ukrainian”; the real concern is that they are not Orthodox. This is not about “Ukrainianization”; it is about returning to Orthodoxy—liberating it from the grip of ideological, pseudo-religious myths.
Dialogue or Investigation?
When Tetyana Kalenychenko spoke of dialogue as a method (including conflict resolution), discussion narrowed in on three fundamental questions:
- Who is the subject of the dialogue?
- What is the goal of dialogue? (Do we share common goals and values?)
- What is the foundation of dialogue?
The first question breaks down into: (a) Who exactly is involved in the dialogue? And (b) on what level is this dialogue happening?
Is it a dialogue between institutional churches, represented by authorized delegates? Between certain parties or groups within the churches who value such a dialogue? Or simply between individuals, backed only by their conscience and perhaps their local community or parish?
The point is not that high-level, official dialogue is blocked—especially by the UOC (although the OCU has not pushed much to overcome this blockage either). Nor is the issue that those within either church who advocate dialogue with the “enemy organization” (OCU in the UOC, and vice versa) are often harshly silenced within their own ecclesiastical structures. We know well the stories of UOC priests who were persecuted for seeking dialogue with the OCU.
The real issue is this: if dialogue mainly takes place on the interpersonal or small-group level, then participants cannot claim to represent entire churches—nor should they be held accountable for their church’s collective failures. When “Fr. Petro” and “Fr. Pavlo” speak together, all talk of “transfers” and “Moscow-aligned positions” must be left aside. These individuals are not responsible for institutional myths. They speak only for themselves—and can answer only for their own actions and conscience.
The second part of this issue: who is the institutional subject of dialogue on the ecclesial level?
In the case of the OCU, this is fairly clear. Despite its complexities, the OCU presents itself as an independent, autocephalous Church. But for the UOC, things are murkier. The UOC may declare its independence and point to the Council of Feofaniya—yet critics will point to the 1990 Charter, the absence of a recognized canonical status between autonomy and autocephaly, and the UOC hierarchy’s inconsistent behavior toward “OCU church seizures” and Moscow’s annexation of entire dioceses. There’s also the issue of clerical collaborators, which cannot be dismissed by pointing to chaplains and volunteers.
The entanglement of UOC faithful with Russian “Orthodox” online spaces; the linguistic and ideological overlap; the quiet but persistent presence of “Holy Russia” ideology in certain dioceses—all raise the pressing question: Is the UOC truly a subject? Or is it merely a de-subjectivized branch of the ROC—where a silent majority does not challenge a Moscow-loyal minority, and the Ukrainian-oriented minority is marginalized?
This can be tested: who gets to speak? Who is punished for speaking? Pro-Moscow voices are loud and frequent (e.g., from Cherkasy, Zaporizhzhia, and elsewhere), while the so-called “dialogue wing” speaks cautiously, often in euphemisms.
Even if such doubts are exaggerated, the core question remains: what is the goal and basis of dialogue?
Real dialogue is built on shared principles and common goals. Without a defined foundation, dialogue becomes a simulation. And these shared principles must be affirmed by both sides.
Let us propose a basic list of such principles (mostly negative, as they are more fundamental):
- a) Rejection of statements that delegitimize each other’s sacramental and canonical status (e.g., “invalid sacraments,” “graceless,” “uncanonical”);
- b) Rejection of physical aggression (e.g., church seizures) and verbal abuse (propaganda of hatred and lies);
- c) Acknowledgment of the abnormality of the current schism and the hostile rhetoric it fuels;
- d) Recognition that the status of an autocephalous church is a legitimate goal for any national Orthodox Church, and that the ancient Ukrainian Church deserves such status;
- e) Affirmation of a shared Orthodox faith, a shared homeland (Ukraine), and the need to find common ground for coexistence;
- f) A shared minimum goal: mutual recognition of sacraments and peaceful liturgical concelebration—and ideally, reunion into one united autocephalous Orthodox Church in Ukraine.
Agreeing on these six points could initiate a real, concrete dialogue. Resolving conflicts over churches is quite practical and feasible once these core questions are addressed.
“Have faith as a mustard seed”: The Global Scale of the Issue
It may all seem utopian in our context, where many hierarchs are invested in preserving their “cozy, mutual antagonisms.”
Yet there was a miracle in 2022. As Natalia Vasylevych recalls, shocked by Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian Orthodox clergy dropped their rivalries for a few months and spoke with one voice at international church forums. And when they did—the Russian delegation, usually loud, had nothing to say.
Indeed, the potential of a single Ukrainian Orthodox voice is powerful. Mathematically speaking, it would be the largest bloc of parishes in the Orthodox world, with strong traditions and theological heritage. The ROC would immediately lose its claim to be the “largest Orthodox Church on the planet.”
No wonder the preservation of Ukrainian division is a strategic priority for Moscow. For Patriarch Kirill, maintaining the schism—ideally eradicating the OCU—is a kind of “ecclesiastical Stalingrad.”
But what is the goal of the UOC leadership? To remain an eternal victim in the ROC’s roleplay of persecution? Clearly, the united voice and collective weight of an OCU+UOC Church would exceed their separate influence. That would benefit bishops, too—if they act as autonomous agents, not proxies for others.
Regardless, clergy are responsible for the myths they have propagated within their flocks. And this is the deeper question: how to undo the myths that priests and bishops themselves have sown for years?
The answer begins with simple, honest communication. Dialogue rooted in our shared Orthodox Christian faith, the Gospel, and the Risen Christ. This is the true foundation and goal of dialogue.
The world is in turmoil. Everything is shaking. Only unity will preserve us. And the sooner we realize this—and embrace our shared foundation in the joy of the Resurrection—the more lives we will save.
And those lives are real. This is our call. And our judgment.
Source: religion.in.ua