Interview conducted by Taras Antoshevskyi, Religious Information Service of Ukraine
“Ukrainian Orthodoxy has been in a state of division for more than 30 years. During this time, its various representatives have formed numerous myths, stereotypes, and prejudices that have greatly complicated inter-church understanding. These prejudices have often been spread both by religious media and by hostile propaganda channels that deliberately manipulated religious narratives with the aim of polarizing Ukrainian society. As a result, religious communities that could have played a peacemaking role instead became sources of conflict and tension.”
This is how the description begins of a project now being launched by the Sophia Brotherhood – a civic association that arose more than a year ago out of dialogue among representatives of different Orthodox denominations in Ukraine.
We speak with member of the Brotherhood Hennadii Khrystokin – religious studies scholar, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor at the Department of International Relations and Strategic Studies of the State University “Kyiv Aviation Institute” – about this project and its themes, about inter-Orthodox dialogue and the state of Orthodoxy in Ukraine, and about relations among Church, state, and society.
— Mr. Hennadii, let us begin with the basics. On what foundation did the Sophia Brotherhood arise, and how did it all begin?
— The foundation of the Sophia Brotherhood movement is the so-called movement of signatories who, after the full-scale invasion, showed civic initiative and gathered around themselves a circle of concerned, patriotically minded priests who appealed to Metropolitan Onufrii for clarification regarding the status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) within the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). At the time this provoked significant public resonance and was positively received by Ukrainian society. It was precisely on the basis of activists from this movement that regular meetings of Orthodox believers from both jurisdictions were later organized at Saint Sophia of Kyiv. And it is these gatherings – supported not only by society but also by the state – that became the foundation for the Sophia Brotherhood.
— The Brotherhood has an unofficial status – among other reasons because none of the Orthodox Churches recognizes you. Is that in fact the case? Does the Brotherhood have a blessing for its activity from any hierarchs?
— The Brotherhood has official status as a civic organization in Ukraine. We are registered with the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, we have our statute and a bank account. We are not a separate religious organization or church structure that would set itself against the Orthodox Church. The Brotherhood is a grassroots initiative, a movement of laity and clergy that proceeds from the Church itself.
The paradox here is that the Church leadership has proved unable to overcome this crisis either on its own or with the help of the state. Therefore an additional factor is needed – that is simultaneously inside the Church and outside it. As an organization, the Brotherhood is not directly subordinate to the leadership of any jurisdiction, but every priest and believer belongs to a specific parish; at the same time we consider ourselves part of the fullness of a future united Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Our members are united by a single goal: to foster peace-building, mutual understanding, and the unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
Today the Brotherhood unites more than 60 official members and more than a hundred friends of the Brotherhood. We know for certain that the circle of our sympathizers is much wider, because the ideas the Brotherhood proclaims are timely and extremely relevant for Ukrainian Orthodoxy and for society. We do not yet have officially any representatives of the episcopate among the Brotherhood’s members, but we know for certain that many hierarchs support its ideas, even if they do not do so publicly for well-known reasons. His All-Holiness Patriarch Bartholomew is aware of our activity, and we have his blessing for our work.
— What does such a status provide? What are its advantages?
— The status of a civic organization gives us the possibility to conduct open, legal, and socially significant work in Ukrainian society and beyond. As a civic organization, we have sufficient freedom in our initiatives, actions, and deliberations. This status makes us an important part of Ukraine’s civil community. We actively cooperate with other non-political civic and non-governmental organizations and with state institutions that support Ukraine in its just struggle for freedom from Russian aggression and that nurture the idea of civil and religious peace in Ukraine.
The Brotherhood defends and represents Ukraine in the international sphere, actively cooperates with international religious and non-governmental organizations, supports peace initiatives, and carries out active volunteer work in Ukraine in support of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
— How did the idea arise to create a project aimed at dismantling myths within the Orthodox milieu?
— We are only one year old, but in that time much has already been done in the media, public, and church spheres. An example of such active work is our large-scale project “Contemporary Ukrainian Orthodoxy: Debunking Myths for the Sake of Reconciliation of the Orthodox in Ukraine and the Consolidation of Ukrainian Society,” supported by the German foundation Renovabis. This six-month project envisages a whole series of important, socially resonant events aimed at achieving reconciliation within Ukrainian Orthodoxy.
— Please provide details – what exactly do you mean?
— We have planned an entire series of activities to implement the project:
- Webinar: “Myths and Prejudices Hindering the Unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy” – 9 April.
- Panel discussion: “Contemporary Ukrainian Orthodoxy: Debunking Myths for the Sake of Orthodox Reconciliation in Ukraine and the Consolidation of Society” – 29 April 2025, Kyiv.
- Creation of a multi-format educational and informational product:
- A cycle of video discussions “Dialogues between Priests of the UOC and the OCU.”
- A cycle of video conversations “Challenges to Contemporary Orthodoxy in Ukraine.”
- Media projects “Sophia Evening Gatherings” and “Gospel Morning.”
- A cycle of printed materials: interviews, articles, and reports on the project’s key topics.
- Regular features: “Readers’ Letters” and “Listeners’ Comments.”
- Round table: “Analysis of Conflict-Generating Factors in Ukraine’s Religious Landscape (Orthodoxy) and in Society.” Presentation of an electronic publication of the project’s printed materials. September 2025, Kyiv.
— For whom is such an extensive program intended, and who should become its participants?
— The project is designed for six months and is aimed at responding to the deep challenges facing Ukrainian Orthodoxy and at creating the prerequisites for dialogue and reconciliation. It is a whole series of events in which members of the Brotherhood will take part, as well as its friends and invited guests – experts, theologians, religious studies scholars, representatives of the jurisdictions – all those who reflect upon and seek to overcome the crisis in Ukrainian Orthodoxy. This rather extensive program includes a webinar on overcoming myths and mutual prejudices; a panel discussion that envisages the search for a constructive way out of the inter-jurisdictional crisis; a cycle of video interviews with experts and with ordinary priests; and much more.
The target audience of the project is the broad public of Ukraine; the faithful of Orthodox Churches; priests and bishops of both jurisdictions; and all concerned persons who think about peace in Ukraine and about overcoming the crisis within Orthodoxy.
— In matters such as these, what is often needed first – speaking in military terms – is reconnaissance, or high-quality diagnostics. That is, we must understand the essence of the problem: who is around us, where the enemy is, and where our own are. As an Orthodox believer and as a scholar, what are the greatest problems and their origins that you see in inter-Orthodox and inter-confessional relations in Ukraine?
— There are very many problems. The chief one is that both jurisdictions deprive one another of the right to subjectivity; they deny the other the right to be itself. Over 30 years each structure has formed stable narratives – self-conceptions sanctioned by the authority of the Church concerning itself, its own history, interpretations of the canons, and its vision of the future – in which the other does not exist. The jurisdictions in Ukraine are like two worlds, two views of Orthodoxy, two fully self-sufficient structures. The truth is that they are too self-sufficient and independent to expect or to need one another, and thus to unite. This is the problem.
They have two closed, self-focused church narratives that in reality neither need nor are interested in the existence of the other. Therefore the closedness and exclusivity of the narratives is the most important problem of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. It is enough to speak with a convinced representative of a given jurisdiction, and one immediately plunges into that person’s narrative, with its own logic, arguments, emotions, and characteristic prejudices.
Over these years Orthodox Christians have generated a large number of myths, dubious convictions, and prejudices about the other. I believe that most of them take the form of cognitive distortions, politicized myths, and ideological constructs that are superimposed on real events and facts. The unfortunate thing is that these myths are created and disseminated by the Orthodox structures themselves, which, regrettably, actively exploit these themes in the mass media. What is bad about such mythology? It is that it does not allow us to see the real person or the real process. We look at an event or situation, but the myth presents it to us in a distorted manner. What lies at the root of all these conflicts – what constantly motivates and fuels them? I think that most of the myths have an ancient origin, a continuity from the past, nourished by recent events, resentments, and emotions; but at bottom these myths are determined by the institutional interests of each jurisdiction, which have their own strategies, political preferences, and influence on society—things that are difficult to challenge and change. The conflict of these interests and strategies determines the duration and character of the Orthodox crisis.
All these numerous contradictions intensified ten years ago, but with the onset of the full-scale invasion they entered a very acute phase. The situation itself impelled a search for the causes of the aggression, and this search rather quickly led to those structures or ideas that were in one way or another connected with the aggressor. And since war generates rapid images and emotions – pain, suffering from losses, a sense of injustice – it is obvious that public opinion sought a quick and simple solution to the Orthodox crisis, sought the guilty, which supposedly guarantees immediate internal security and protection from the ideology of the “Russian World.” This search continues even now; it is indeed important – we must understand the causes of the war – but the search for causes and the establishment of guilt are different things. They are carried out by different means and have different mechanisms of implementation. And what is important is that quick reactions and simple solutions do not change complex structures and long-term crises. The Churches are complex, inertial structures, rooted in tradition, that have traversed a long path; they cannot be changed in haste, as we already see.
At one time Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman described two systems of human thinking – fast and slow. The first operates automatically in defense and in danger from an enemy; it stimulates our survival reactions, but it is designed for a short-term effect – to survive right now in this situation. The second system – slow thinking – presupposes careful consideration of the situation, calculation, and the search for alternatives; it is designed for the long distance and sees the situation in all its complexity. In my view, under the influence of the pain of war, we all resorted to quick and not fully thought-out reactions. We rightly want our principal enemy, the Russian Federation, to disappear, and for just punishment to take place for all its crimes. But the binary (dual) thinking generated by quick decisions simplifies everything and transfers the image of the enemy from the outside to the search for an internal enemy. As a result, both jurisdictions fall into a mode of rapid reactions based on defense and self-defense; they see reality through a conflict matrix – “ours and theirs,” “canonical and non-canonical,” “Ukrainian and Muscovite.” And this only aggravates an already long-standing, thirty-year inter-Orthodox conflict.
In fact, such an evaluative matrix has not justified itself over the past thirty years: the Orthodox jurisdictions did not come to accept one another before the war, and still less will they come to mutual recognition during the war. Yet it is evident that such a situation does not contribute to Ukraine’s national security; it divides Ukrainian society, prolongs the inter-jurisdictional conflict, entrenches the image of the enemy; and, most importantly, even in the future it offers no way out.
— Sociological studies indicate that, in Ukraine, inter-Orthodox relations – between the UOC and the OCU—are the least tolerant among all interconfessional relations. In your view, against the backdrop of public approval of forceful methods of inter-Orthodox “dialogue” around church buildings, does your project have prospects? Will it not run counter to public opinion?
— In truth, we are all witnesses to the intolerance of inter-Orthodox relations, the devaluing of one another by representatives of Orthodox jurisdictions, the unwillingness to listen and to understand. Indeed, we should abandon illusions and be sober and wise: if the conflict paradigm of relations is not recognized and overcome, then the inter-Orthodox crisis will never be resolved in principle. Let us be realists: the existing paradigm of their conflictual coexistence leads to a dead end; there is no sense in continuing further, and dragging out the situation only complicates everything. We must seek a way out and do so constructively.
Therefore our project is unequivocally promising. We are working for the future, but we are taking real steps right now. The Brotherhood is oriented toward constructive steps. We understand the situation from within both jurisdictions; we see healthy forces among priests and hierarchs in both structures and among the faithful. And we strive to rally these sound and active forces; we seek to cooperate with those who think and who are responsible. At the same time, we also see prejudices; we know about the great power of inertia, which always exists and will continue to exist – especially in religious groups and in a situation of mutual distrust. And public dissonance will always be present, because Ukraine is a living social organism in which everything hurts; there are many group interests; alongside difficult choices there are temptations of simple solutions; there is social and ecclesial inertia and conflicting positions. But someone must do this work, and we call for joint labor for the sake of Ukraine. Therefore, together we must shape public opinion at all levels – jointly to comprehend a vision for the future of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, to think through the steps, to cast off prejudices and fears – and may the Lord help us.
— But what are the prospects in this conflict? Is it possible for the Churches themselves to overcome it?
— I believe that the leadership of both jurisdictions is not presently ready for active and direct dialogue. I think that, as usual, church elites will postpone dialogue, look for reasons not to enter into frank conversation, and avoid making real decisions. But this does not mean that dialogue is impossible. On the contrary, precisely now it is vitally necessary for Ukraine, which is fighting for the right to freedom and existence in the contemporary, complex world. And this dialogue must begin from below; it is already being initiated and implemented by rank-and-file faithful, parish clergy, theologians, and scholars of religion. In history we have often encountered situations where a wave of initiatives rose from below, which the church leadership was then compelled to support. The “Sophia Brotherhood” can become – and is already becoming – a space for such dialogue, a common space of unity and mutual understanding.
Here our joint efforts are important: overcoming mutual resentments, refuting myths, recognizing the other. The role of ordinary Ukrainians is very important as well.
— Do Ukrainians understand this conflict, and how do they perceive it? What are the positions and motivations of the parties to the conflict?
— If we set emotions aside, they largely do not understand why this conflict continues or what purpose it serves. In wartime, the general public reacts emotionally and situationally; it wants effective steps, reconciliation between the jurisdictions, peace for Ukraine. Amid a peak of emotion and tension, society wants clarity and definitiveness. Any secrecy, ambiguity, mistakes, negligence, passivity, and even silence provoke irritation and suspicion in the public consciousness. Everything ought to serve cohesion; everyone ought to stand together so that, by joint efforts, we may endure.
A situation of maximal social and emotional tension has influenced the perception of inter-jurisdictional relations. Personal religiosity and faith as a private matter do not raise objections among Ukrainians – people pray and preach here, read books, write, and think not only in Ukrainian but also in Russian. The problem arises when religious symbolism comes into conflict with civic-political symbolism.
The sphere of religion is a powerful symbolic field in social life. Through religious discourse people expect to receive consolation, comfort, guidance or instruction, wisdom and hope; it should calm and motivate. For a person, religion ought to be something authoritative, not provoking resistance, contributing to social harmony. The language of religion should not inflame or generate internal or social conflict. But when religious language does not correspond to social expectations, its use in the public sphere raises many questions. Even more acute are situations when religion displays public disrespect for civic sacrality – when its representatives do not honor the fallen, do not condemn aggression, or openly identify themselves with Russian ideology and identity.
The UOC has found itself in precisely such a situation. Several conflict factors have converged here. The issue is not only that the clergy of this Church often speak and preach in Russian, and not even that thousands of UOC churches and communities are in no hurry to transfer to the OCU – this is their right, and the UOC is not persecuted in Ukraine for it. Conflict arises when the rhetoric and actions of UOC spokespersons violate the symbolic field of social concord. This rhetoric appears incomprehensible and even provocative for the Ukrainian public sphere. The UOC leadership communicates little with society and the authorities; it remains silent on condemning aggression and on the activities of overt collaborators.
I am convinced that society would understand the UOC better if its leadership addressed citizens directly, acknowledged the mistakes of certain individuals, and set out its own – but comprehensible – truth about prospects for relations with the OCU and the severing of ties with the ROC. Instead of sending positive signals, opening up, and communicating, they close themselves off, isolate themselves, and publicly interpret the tension between the Church and society as an encroachment on their own world – as coercion and a desire to destroy them.
But the principal mistake is the UOC’s refusal to clearly dissociate itself from the ROC, which has created an additional potential for conflict. The inconsistent decisions of the Council of 27 May 2022 left unanswered the question of dependence on the ROC and, consequently, the question of Russia’s influence. In wartime such indeterminacy of position is perceived as concealment of ties with the Church of the aggressor state.
The UOC makes another mistake when it portrays the aggravation of the Orthodox crisis in Ukraine as a conflict between Church and state – claiming that the state supposedly decided without grounds to “take the Lavra” and facilitates the “seizure” of churches. Viewed more broadly, the state is reacting spontaneously to the situation, attempting to take into account the sentiments of civil society and of international partners, and assessing the level of threat to national security.
In Ukraine there is no conflict between the Church and unbelievers, between the Church and a secular state, or between believers and a “nationalist” government. What exists is a conflict between structures that dwell in different symbolic fields; it is a conflict of church discourses and narratives. The UOC is attempting to preserve its structure at any cost – even at the cost of conflict with the authorities and with society. For it, the priority is to preserve corporate unity, to retain resources and presence in all territories, even at the price of confrontation with the state. Meanwhile, the state and society see the goal in the unity of the symbolic field of a single Ukraine, united for victory.
The UOC has fallen into the trap of its own long-formed prejudices, at the root of which lies the fear of schism. There they have come to believe that “whoever is not with us is against us,” that whoever is not in our structure is a schismatic. This is a closed narrative. For society, structures are not what matters; what is valued is the integrity and solidarity of ministers who see human suffering and are ready to take decisive steps for the sake of the love and truth of God.
Is the OCU ready for dialogue? How is it perceived in the public consciousness? Having received the support of the authorities and the Tomos, the OCU has received a huge advance for the future. In the symbolic field of the media it actively demonstrates that it is a people’s, Ukrainian, patriotic Church, and it is perceived as the Ukrainian Church by the majority, because it forms Ukrainian identity and symbolizes the unity of religion and people. Yet the OCU bears a heavy burden of the past – resentments, corporate interests, and the desire to seize the moment and expand. Here there is not only an ideal goal but also a hidden interest: now there is, as it were, just recompense for previous years of humiliation. It is ready for dialogue with the UOC on its own terms, which it seeks to accelerate so as to deprive its competitor of advantages. It is highly desirable that the OCU not repeat the UOC’s mistakes in interaction with the authorities, that it likewise move out of the conflict paradigm of thinking, and that by all its statements and actions it not alienate those priests and laypeople who are ready to change jurisdiction.
What, then, does society expect from the Church as a whole? It wants both Churches to forget their corporate interests, to unite in a common symbolic field for the sake of love; it wants them to make decisions that do not contradict the will of God, conscience, and society’s expectations. For the Church is not only canons, shrines, and corporate interests; the Church is a bearer of the light of life, peace, and love – a milieu of communion with Christ.
— One sometimes hears the opinion that these two branches are in fact similar, since they have the same roots reaching back to Soviet times or even earlier. In those times the authorities actively fostered the attitude toward those who think differently as enemies – using the ancient formula “divide and rule” in a perverse form that split society itself. The search for supposed enemies diverted attention from real enemies. Is this not why a significant part of the clergy of both Orthodox Churches treats colleagues from the other confession negatively “by default”?
— One can agree that both jurisdictions carry within themselves a certain measure of so-called ecclesial “Sovietness”: bureaucratism, the separation of the hierarchy from clergy and laity, arbitrariness and impunity of hierarchs, the powerlessness of parish clergy, and playing politics with the authorities. Yet we must also say that these negative tendencies did not disappear fundamentally in the years of Ukraine’s independence. The leaders of the Orthodox Churches gave little thought to change within the Church, to real dialogue with society, or to raising the level of education among the faithful and the clergy. Instead, they expended all efforts on inflaming inter-jurisdictional struggle and on building structures. Now we see how unpromising the conflict model of interaction is, and we strive together to overcome it.
— Such an attitude toward others – as enemies a priori, or at least as competitors – exists not only among Orthodox but also with respect to other confessions, Churches, or religions. Under the tsars and under the USSR, the ROC was dominant and others were at best second-rate or even prohibited. The “bacteria” of being dominant – the condescending attitude – can still be felt at times in statements by Orthodox clergy and even hierarchs. Of course, biased attitudes toward “others” may occur among all, but this does not justify those who consider such bias normal. What should be done about it?
— It seems to me that it is insufficient to seek the causes of mutual rejection and unhealthy competition among Orthodox solely in the echo of Soviet church practices. They certainly existed and their influence should not be underestimated, but overall the causes of mutual hostility among Orthodox in Ukraine also have their own historical roots. Unfortunately our forebears left us few examples of constructive solutions to socio-political and church problems. We too are prone to social competition; we have not lost our inclination to political and ecclesial corporatism; we cannot relinquish exclusivist approaches in relations with opponents; we often look for enemies among citizens of our own country. Not only in church matters do we encounter distrust, prejudice, conflict, and an inability to take the interests of the parties into account.
Nevertheless, these are things we all ought to overcome within ourselves. This truly is not the norm and must not become so. Ukrainians possess many qualities that enable us to unite, to cooperate, to sacrifice, to help, to rally, and to win—and we have especially felt this during these three years of Russian aggression. I think this wave of cohesion and civic enthusiasm has not affected church structures to a sufficient degree; they continue to live their own lives even in wartime.
The Orthodox Church, unfortunately, also exhibits another dubious trait that hinders dialogue not only between jurisdictions but also within each Church: a huge distance between the “upper” and “lower” levels of the Church. In Orthodoxy, three “castes” exist in practice without normal communication among them – between the episcopate, the clergy, and the laity. This is a crisis of conciliarity in Orthodoxy. Christian conciliarity and genuine ecclesial life have not a vertical but a horizontal dimension. The Church is not only hierarchy but also a networked community. This means that in the Church laypeople and clergy should play no lesser a role than bishops. Overcoming excessive concentration on church structures and hierarchies will, to a great extent, reduce tensions in religious confessions and jurisdictions and will raise the importance of active laity. Among us there must not be higher and lower, untouchables and “scapegoats,” if we wish to build a free, sovereign, law-governed Ukraine.
— Related to this is the issue of state–church relations. I once heard from a clergyman of what was then the UOC–KP that Ukraine should emulate state – church relations in Russia – i.e., with a dominant Church – which would supposedly “bring order.” Should we not, especially at the regional level, cultivate another format of state – confessional relations – partnership instead of favoritism, and so forth? One can speak much about equality, yet on the ground one encounters “everything for our own, the law for others.”
— The situation I have described rules out an approach by which there could be a dominant religious confession in Ukraine. This is uncharacteristic and unhelpful for Ukraine and could be harmful – not only for state – church relations in general but even for that hypothetically dominant Church or for a united, local Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Elevating one confession above others will certainly not foster partnership among the confessions; it can become a temptation to play politics with the authorities.
Nevertheless, there are many cases – locally and centrally – when the authorities provide more assistance to or cooperate more closely with certain religious communities or confessions. Such situations are quite understandable, since local authorities are elected and try to please their voters. Yet for the authorities all believers must be equal citizens whose interests and rights are protected equally by law. The best option is when this interaction proceeds according to the principle of the greatest possible and mutually beneficial cooperation with a given religious community without violating the law.
Obviously, the potential and influence of particular religious communities differ; there are always more or less influential groups at the local level, or more or less “popular” ones. But the law protects not the strong but the weak from restrictions or violations of their rights. The law guarantees equal opportunities; the authorities must create equal conditions, but they should not provide one-sided assistance to one of the parties.
Much depends on the initiative of the religious communities themselves – on their local authority, the support of the faithful, business, and partners. For the state, religious communities are civic organizations, and they must fight for their rights, up to and including defending them in court. If a given religious community wants greater support and representation of its interests, it is advisable for it to be open and active, to interact with other religious groups and confessions, and to support citizens’ initiatives; in this way attitudes can be changed. Conversely, if, for example, a UOC community closes in on itself, shuts itself off, hides its activities from the local community, and displays disloyalty toward the feelings and emotions of local residents, then the consequences may be appropriate. Thus partnership presupposes active, open, and constructive interaction of religious communities with representatives of other religious groups, with local authorities, and with local residents. And yes, this is not easy, but it is worth doing for the common good and for the sake of peace.
— Does the Brotherhood in general address the issue of the Church’s social presence, of social ethics, and the like? This too is a way out of the paradigm of state – church relations that has developed in countries with an Orthodox majority.
— We are convinced that we must overcome the paradigm in which the Church’s existence is viewed only through its relations with the state. The Church’s being can be understood in the context of and in active cooperation with civil society and its institutions. This is stated quite vividly by Patriarch Bartholomew and in the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s document For the Life of the World. It concerns the formation of an open Orthodoxy. This is a vision of the Church as a community that is not closed for the elect and not focused solely on Tradition. By its very nature, the Orthodox Church is open to the world and to society; it is called to transform, to change, to transfigure it. Open Orthodoxy is oriented to preaching, to openness toward culture, science, and society – not with the aim of subjugating the world, but with the aim of transforming it. It is Orthodoxy of active cooperation and interaction with civil society and the state. Conversely, we can call that Orthodoxy closed which is oriented toward self-preservation of its own structures, toward archiving tradition, and toward avoiding openness to dialogue.
In fact, the Church has no sharply drawn boundaries; it is potentially open to all, because in it and through it God accomplishes His presence in the world. We ought not to restrict God’s plans by erecting borders around the Church. I believe that in God’s plan we are to be united, not divided; reconciled, not set at odds. Therefore the Church’s role in developing a social ethic of peace and love is key. This is an ethic of responsibility, freedom, peace, and justice – but first of all an ethic of peace and love. Churches must teach the social virtues of self-restraint, self-improvement, justice, and solidarity.
The format of church–state relations in Ukraine must be changed. To build in Ukraine a law-governed state, a civil society, and a partnership between them and the Church, the social model proposed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate is the most suitable. It substantiates the Church’s active participation in social processes and justifies the possibility of actively forming civil society in Ukraine.
Therefore it is critically important that the Orthodox Churches fully adapt to their social doctrines the provisions on the values of civil society set forth in the documents of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This will make it possible for the UOC and the OCU to create conditions for peace and unity, to establish partnership relations with the state, to take an active part in the development of civil society, and to become true bearers of spiritual authority in Ukrainian society. For Ukraine, the adoption of a system of civil values is an important task, the fulfillment of which could ensure the establishment and maintenance of peace and harmony in Ukrainian society, its stable European orientation, and a new partnership model of church–state relations.
— We can speak at length about theories of “how it ought to be.” But from ideas to realities there can be not only a long road, but also incomprehension – “do we need this at all,” “who needs it,” and so forth. Is there an understanding that the old models of Church–society–state relations are not ones we should keep – even if we feel comfortable, because they allow us to do nothing? Not least because the percentage of Orthodox in society is decreasing, secularization is advancing rapidly, and trust in the Church as an institution is already far from what it once was?
— What I can agree with is that the situation of crisis suits many, because it justifies passivity, the unwillingness to make efforts, to come to agreement, and it postpones changes in Orthodoxy and in society. Everything is written off to the war or to circumstances – or to enemies who always “get in the way.” All this could be left for later, were it not a matter of our survival in both the literal and the figurative sense. For it concerns our existential survival under Russian aggression, and it concerns the survival of the country in the new geopolitical reality that we now observe in the world and around Ukraine.
I am convinced that we cannot allow ourselves to be passive; this is absolutely irresponsible with respect to Ukraine and to our future. Ultimately, it is simply dangerous and even a direct path to the precipice. For the question now stands quite starkly: either we as a people and a state will survive and change, or we will disappear from the political map of the world. Precisely so: if we do not change – we will disappear. If we do not change – we will not win this war.
We truly all face difficult and unpleasant social and political transformations. The country and society require these transformations; our consciousness and social practices require change; and, finally, Ukrainian Orthodoxy requires qualitative changes and reforms. For too long we have delayed, shifted responsibility to opponents, waited for favorable circumstances, consoled ourselves with reflections on our glorious history, or dreamed of an unattainable future. We can no longer postpone; we must act – go out to meet reality, see it, comprehend the truth about ourselves, our condition, our history. And the war has laid bare this reality and this truth for many. We all need such social and ecclesial realism, and at the same time a restrained and courageous optimism—not to fall into extremes and into despair.
I understand how difficult this is: to accept the situation, to acknowledge the full range of our problems, to see everything as it is, not to turn away from our own and others’ mistakes, to accept our complex and troubled history, not to look for excuses, not to succumb to inferiority complexes, lamentation, and complaining. And the reality is that we have no golden age in the past to which it is worth returning; we have a very modest and problematic future; we have a very difficult and uncertain present. The support of our partners, as we see, is not stable. No one can give us guarantees.
Here it will not do to write everything off to the external enemy, who truly exists and will always be near our borders. Nor should we harbor illusions about the disappearance of inconvenient internal opponents, for they will not go anywhere. And all of us Ukrainians are very different, complex, problematic, and stubborn; for some reason we have decided that everyone owes us, and that everything can be explained by the failures of history. We are all in the same ark called Ukraine and we must survive. And we must finally learn to steer this boat – not merely to drift wherever the wind of history carries us, but to have a rudder, to take the oars in hand, and to row toward our own goal – especially if the sails are not filled with a favorable wind or if the engine has stopped. Only strong nations win – those who do not abandon the boat and who row to the last. We are not victims; this is simply our historical lot, which we must change. Let us be stoic Christians. To accept and to change Ukraine’s historical destiny – that must be our motto. And precisely for this we need effort, change, and faith in our future. And may God help us!
— Amen!
Source: risu.ua