The most significant event of the Easter period in Ukraine’s socio-religious life was undoubtedly the Roundtable and panel discussion within the project “Modern Ukrainian Orthodoxy: Debunking Myths for the Sake of Reconciliation Among Orthodox Christians in Ukraine and Societal Unity,” organized by the Sophia Brotherhood.
It is rare nowadays for representatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the UOC, and the OCU (clergy, civil servants, scholars, journalists, and laypeople) to gather together to discuss challenges and prospects for Orthodox reconciliation in Ukraine and overcoming inter-jurisdictional prejudices (some participated remotely). The presence of representatives from all branches of Ukrainian Orthodoxy prevented the event from becoming a collective condemnation of any particular jurisdiction while elevating another. Participants spoke honestly and openly about current issues in Ukrainian Churches—both shared problems and those specific to certain jurisdictions.
The first issue, common to both dominant Orthodox Churches in Ukraine, was raised by the Rector of the Volyn Orthodox Theological Academy (OCU), Archpriest Volodymyr Vakin. According to him, “all jurisdictions suffer from phantom pains of Moscow-style administration.” In his view, this threatens to transform Ukrainian Orthodoxy into “ROC version 2.0.” As an example, he cited the Statute of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which outlines the procedures of the Synod—document discussions, agenda formation, consideration of episcopal candidates, and decision-making procedures. However, he noted that these rules are difficult to implement in practice because the model itself is unnatural for Ukraine. At the same time, he emphasized that culture is emerging, and the role of theologians, clergy, and laity is particularly important in this context.
The issue of the discrepancy between theory and practice in our Churches was further developed by Vyacheslav Horshkov, Head of the Department for Cooperation with Religious Communities at the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience:
“The Churches have created an image of the ‘ideal church’ in the rest of society. But the problem is that they have formed this image but do not live up to it themselves. And if a community that claims to uphold high values fails to practice them at a critical moment—when these values need to be more than just beautifully articulated medieval formulas—it essentially admits that it has hopelessly fallen behind its own standards. Very often, we see that people from other worldview traditions (not only religious ones) are more righteous even by biblical standards… In my official capacity, I have to communicate with various representatives of different religious communities. Especially after the full-scale invasion, I have learned of such cases that make me think: if such a person had lived ten centuries ago in the Christian Church, they would probably have been canonized. And this person could be a member of the Hare Krishna society, a Muslim, a Jew, or someone else.”
Professor Serhiy Bortnyk of the Kyiv Theological Academy (UOC) reminded that, according to sociological surveys, over two years, the number of Orthodox Christians in Ukraine decreased from 62% to 55%, while the numbers in other denominations remained almost unchanged. Meanwhile, the number of people who do not consider themselves religious increased by nearly 7%, suggesting that the increase occurred at the expense of former Orthodox believers.
However, religious scholar Vyacheslav Horshkov draws entirely different conclusions:
“When we talk about the decline in church-related sociological data, to be honest, I do not believe in a decrease in the number of Orthodox Christians. For me, this is simply an indication that the number of sympathizers in Orthodoxy or supporters of a particular church is decreasing.”
Mr. Horshkov considers the lack of internal church sociology a serious problem:
“Protestants, if asked how many members they have, can provide an exact number down to the individual. But when we talk about Orthodox Christians, we rely on data from the Razumkov Center or other specialists. For example, during festive services, who provides the number of attendees at Christmas or Easter services—the churches? The police! Doesn’t the church know how many people attend? And how many of these are occasional visitors versus regular parishioners? How many members? For a long time, it was convenient for someone to have this mess in Orthodoxy, without order. And now we have these scandalous situations. Because it should not be the state’s responsibility to ensure order in the church. The church itself was not interested in having order.”
The pressing issue of dual ecclesiastical jurisdictions in Ukraine was raised by Professor Hennadii Khrystokin (Kyiv). However, he himself does not view this situation as a major problem.
“In Ukraine, there is hardly a single religious denomination that doesn’t have multiple streams or internal factions. So when does a problem arise? A problem emerges when we try to forcibly construct one unified church, one confession. I believe that this typical Ukrainian situation of diversity, pluralism, openness, and the parallel coexistence of various directions, confessions, groups, and religions is a perfectly normal experience for Ukraine. Therefore, we should preserve these two identities without the destructive actions that actually prevent them from being the Church of Christ. They each have the right to interpret the Ukrainian Orthodox tradition—as long as that interpretation does not generate conflict, discord, internal information wars, and clashes.”
However, the majority of participants at the meeting considered the current “two-church situation” in Ukraine to be abnormal. One representative of the UOC specifically addressed this issue:
“Both structures (the UOC and the OCU – S.B.) perceive themselves as self-sufficient, functioning well internally. Neither feels the need to join or unite with the other to be complete. It’s as if to say: ‘We are fine; we live a full ecclesiastical life, and the issue of unity is something external to our self-sufficiency. It’s optional.’ To me, this clearly indicates that the biblical understanding of the Church has been displaced in both jurisdictions. Because if we turn to the New Testament and read the Gospel of John—the high priestly prayer of Christ—we hear: ‘That they all may be one, just as You, Father, are in Me, and I in You, that they also may be in Us, so that the world may believe that You sent Me.’ So what do we see? The Church’s witness about Christ as the Son of God becomes impossible if there is no unity among Christians. Christ says: if you are not united, the world will not believe that I am the Son of God. Therefore, this is not an optional question of unity—it is a question of the very essence of the Church.”
The issue of conflicts related to parishes transferring to another jurisdiction and the re-registration of church property was touched upon only briefly. Still, participants repeatedly emphasized the inadmissibility of such actions in current inter-confessional relations.
Much more attention was given to the perceived passivity of the UOC leadership in the context of war. Professor Yurii Chornomorets (Kyiv) was the first to raise this concern:
“The Ukrainian Orthodox Church must return to realism. Either autocephaly is declared unilaterally, or it results from consultations moderated by the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Canon law and the real situation offer no other options… If you look at history, any Orthodox people under such conditions declare autocephaly—and that’s it. There’s a genocidal war against the people, and you are the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian people, the Orthodox of Ukraine… Why didn’t you declare autocephaly? Everyone understands that if the UOC had turned to Constantinople—even just for some clarification on a canonical solution—a way out might have been found… The Ukrainian Orthodox Church claims it has somehow distanced itself from Patriarch Kirill. And then, for example, Metropolitan Theodosius of Cherkasy appears—not only commemorating him but clearly stating in his sermon that our duty is to preserve a united spiritual and canonical space that has existed here for a thousand years, whose center was first in Kyiv and then in Moscow. We must preserve this unity. The Synod’s reaction? Zero. Was a Council of Bishops convened? Was he removed from office? Nothing of the sort happened.”
The question of whether there should be any connection with the Russian Orthodox Church at all—and the permissibility of commemorating the head of the ROC during services (something that unfortunately still occurs in some UOC parishes)—was addressed by another UOC representative:
“If the public statements of a Church leader contradict Christian morality, we should not appeal to canon law, but to the Gospel. He loses legitimacy. If theses are voiced that clearly contradict the Gospel, we don’t need to search for a canon under which this falls. In such cases, canon law becomes secondary. It regulates our Christian life—if we are Christians. Therefore, in my opinion, the issue of commemorating the patriarch or submitting to him was already resolved in the first two weeks of the war when his stance in support of the war became clear. As a pastor, he lost legitimacy for us. This question, we could say, is closed.
If a Church during wartime submits to a person who clearly, unequivocally, and publicly expresses anti-Gospel ideas, that Church puts itself at risk of ceasing to be the Church at all. This is not about preserving canonical ties. On the contrary, if we preserve that connection, we lose our connection with the Gospel.”
Particularly striking were the reflections of both speakers and other participants during the discussion on the nature of the modern Church—what it should be, and unfortunately, what it currently is not.
“In the 20th century, places where Orthodox Christians were a minority became those where Orthodoxy was most actively expressed—in the realm of social or academic activity. Take, for example, America or France. Orthodox Christians in France are a minority within a minority, yet they contributed much more to global Orthodox influence than Christian nations where over 50% of the population are Orthodox.”
— Danylo Leleko, philosopher.
“If we look at the entire history of Christianity, it is the communities, the religious movements, the dialogues aimed at common service that remain alive. Orthodoxy, in particular—though this applies to all Christian denominations—suffers from a specific disease, which is especially acute in Orthodoxy: the disease of closing in on itself. The Gospel imperative is forgotten—that the Church is a community of Christ’s disciples called to serve people in this world.”
– Yurii Chornomorets, philosopher.
“In most traditional historical denominations, a person attending a liturgy experiences it like a concert or a performance and says to themselves: I come to church to relax. I don’t gather as the Church—I come to church, because I enjoy the atmosphere. I compare my psychological state when I ‘relaxed’ at the liturgy and when I ‘relaxed’ in a philharmonic concert hall—it becomes nearly identical. But the same effect can be achieved in nature, in the woods, etc. The only thing missing is the charisma that manifests specifically in a community, in communal interaction.
I decided to conduct an experiment—I invited a group of volunteers I worked with in social ministry to say a prayer not formally, but in their own words. The volunteers who came from Protestant churches (which is an interesting experience, as our ministry includes people from the UOC, the OCU, and Protestant denominations) had no difficulty expressing prayer in their own words.
But not a single Orthodox believer could utter even a few words (for example: ‘God, I thank You, I love You, I care deeply for our soldiers’).
It seems to me that we lack a certain component that was present in the early Christian gatherings, where people didn’t just come to church—they gathered as the Church. They recognized their gifts, discussed and explored them”.
– Fr. Oleksii Kulakovskyi, UOC.
“I look at the UOC with great hope, because it includes many vibrant parishes, living priests, and active laypeople. That’s why I find it baffling that there’s still no break with Moscow. This Church is very healthy, very strong, very full of life, yet it continues to bind its own hands and push itself into this Muscovite well, drowning itself in that swamp.”
– Yurii Chornomorets, philosopher.
“I have friends, including a priest, who sent his children to a Catholic school run by the Salesian Sisters. And you know why? Because the Orthodox Church hasn’t managed to create a single school in the city of Kyiv. That’s a stark sign that we’ve lost the core nerve that Orthodoxy should have: mission.
A year ago, our parish switched entirely to Ukrainian for the liturgy, and underwent a full reformatting. But now former parishioners walk around the neighborhood spreading rumors that we are ‘graceless’ because we serve in Ukrainian. We’re not open. Society doesn’t see our churches as spaces of safety, inspiration, or simple human openness—places where any topic can be freely discussed. And we need to talk about this. We must not stop. We’re all in a terrible crisis. And to avoid being completely atomized on our native land, we must speak and act. There is no other way forward.”
– Archpriest Ioann Tronko, UOC.
“In fact, any dialogue, even if it is based on distant prospects, is desperately needed. Why? Because the first thing that dialogue does is vaccinate us against the exclusivism we talked about earlier—one of the main causes of the division within Ukrainian Orthodoxy. In this way, we are effectively fulfilling the second commandment—and in that commandment are the Law and the Prophets.”
– Tetiana Derkach, journalist.
It is clear that today, the Ukrainian Orthodox community is going through far from its best times. Still recovering from the trauma of the atheist era, it has spent nearly the entire post-atheist period suffering from internal divisions—devoting almost all its physical, material, intellectual, and spiritual resources to fighting fellow believers. While Orthodox hierarchs often speak of peace and unity among their brothers in faith, their words never translate into action.
The Sophiian Brotherhood is the first organization in Ukraine to take even small but concrete steps in this direction—organizing inter-Orthodox meetings, round tables, and seminars. And while events like this one remain virtually unnoticed even among Ukrainian Orthodox faithful, as one participant of this round table noted: “A soldier firing from the trench may seem to have no impact on the enemy’s defeat. But it is precisely through such acts of soldierly heroism that our victory is forged.”