Софійське Братство – громадська організація

#thoughts_aloud: The New “Religious” Law. Is It Better With It or Without It?

This material was created within the framework of the mini-project “Thoughts Aloud” for the joint project of the Sophia Brotherhood and the German foundation Renovabis, “Modern Ukrainian Orthodoxy: Debunking Myths for the Sake of Reconciliation among the Orthodox in Ukraine and the Consolidation of Ukrainian Society.” The Sophia Brotherhood may not share the views of the authors, and individual opinions expressed within the project may not represent the consolidated position of the Sophia Brotherhood.

Priest Heorhii Mudrovskyi, (name changed for confidentiality reasons)

What Yuliia Sirko’s Interview Is About

The media outlet Glavcom recently published an interview with Ukrainian Member of Parliament Yuliia Sirko — one of the active lobbyists for the swift implementation of the Law of Ukraine “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Sphere of Religious Organizations” (better known as the Law on the Prohibition of the UOC), adopted by the Verkhovna Rada in August last year. Ms. Sirko spoke in detail about the difficulties that arise in putting this law into practice, either due to objective circumstances or the human factor.

According to the politician, the first problem is the obvious sabotage by the Cabinet of Ministers. In her view, certain employees of the Cabinet who sympathize with the UOC are deliberately delaying processes related to the enforcement of the Law. A significant problem is also the work of the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience, whose “institutional capacity raises many questions. Most of the functions of restoring order in this sphere fall precisely on it. However, the staffing, qualifications, and salaries of the employees do not correspond to the level of the tasks assigned… The staff of the State Service was expanded, sufficient budget funds were allocated, so they should have hired these lawyers just as Ukraine hires legal services for international courts. But either there is no managerial capacity or no political will… The implementation of this Law should be выделено into a separate serious block, and the Head of the State Service should have a separate deputy who would deal with this 24/7. This person does not need to deeply understand theology but must deeply understand bureaucratic and legal processes. Focusing on this issue should be the number one priority for the Service,” Ms. Sirko believes.

In her opinion, local administrations and councils also seriously obstruct the implementation of the Law (namely, the transfer of communities or church buildings from the UOC to the OCU). “At the local level, everything is much more complicated. Politicians do not want to touch the issue of the church at all, because they need voters, many of whom attend the Russian church… no one wants to take this on (stimulating transitions from the UOC — ed.), because the topic is very sensitive, especially when there is no political will visible from above.”

When asked by the journalist whether the OCU should be more actively involved in the process of transferring parishes from the UOC, the MP believes that “yes, the OCU should be actively involved (although it is unclear how exactly — ed.)… But no one wants to take this on, because the topic is very sensitive, especially when there is no political will visible from above. Moreover, one must remember that the OCU also has limited capacity. If tomorrow, conditionally, four thousand parishes were transferred to them, I do not think they would be able to staff them, because they simply do not have that many priests.”

Thus, to summarize, in the opinion of the MP, the full implementation of this Law is hindered by three factors: sabotage by the Cabinet of Ministers, the inability of the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience to perform the necessary work for certain reasons (staffing and financial), and the unpreparedness of the OCU to “digest” the parishes that have already been transferred to it, let alone those that may be transferred in the future.

Is the Very Path of the Law Wrong?

Reading this interview, a thought arises: has Ms. Sirko considered that the attempt to solve the problem of “Muscovite influence” in the UOC by means of its strict legal suppression through the new law is, in general, a fundamentally flawed path? That it is directed not only directly against millions of innocent citizens of Ukraine, but also will bring no benefit either to society or to the state as a whole?

The MP herself understands that among the opponents of the “voluntary-compulsory” transfer of UOC parishes to the OCU there are many people in central and regional authorities, among businesspeople, and even among the supposedly directly interested party — the OCU. So perhaps, after all, something is wrong with that law?

Yes, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church indeed has a major problem (first and foremost for the structure itself) — the almost open sympathies toward the aggressor state, primarily on the part of its leadership. And accordingly, similar phenomena are observed among the episcopate and clergy, and to a lesser extent among ordinary believers. But at the same time, one must understand that all these so-called carriers of such sympathies constitute only an insignificant percentage of the entire body of representatives of the Church. And the entire UOC, in the fourth year of the war, despite the loss of a significant number of churches, clergy, and faithful — even in non-occupied territories — still numbers in the millions; their churches are full, monasteries are inhabited.

UOC communities whose churches were taken away almost never disappear, but simply continue to pray in adapted premises (which, incidentally, does not contradict the law in any way). As a result, in a given locality, instead of one former parish, two Orthodox parishes hostile to each other emerge. Does this benefit the state and society?

But this is only one possible scenario after a UOC parish is deprived of its church. Quite often, the “transferred” church buildings simply stand empty, because no priest was found for them or the entire community followed its rector. At the same time, the displaced UOC parishioners pray in some small house or even in the open air.

Several weeks ago, the same outlet described the inter-church situation in Ukraine (the article “What Is Wrong with the OCU? Sharp Questions for Metropolitan Epifanii”) by the same author who interviewed Ms. Sirko. The journalist quoted interesting observations about the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra made by one of the former hierarchs of the UOC who joined the OCU: “Previously, life was bustling: nine liturgies a day were served, there were pilgrims, candles were bought, prayer requests were taken. And now in the Lavra — silence, animation, five newly tonsured monks… The same with many other cities — the churches stand empty.”

So is the path of total (or at least maximal) prohibition of the UOC really the optimal solution to the problem of Muscovite influence in the religious sphere? Or should a different path have been chosen?

Collective Punishment or Targeted Responsibility?

After all, neither by any law nor by other means is it possible to destroy the UOC as a separate mass religious community — this becomes increasingly obvious to everyone. Even with the maximum implementation of the new law, this structure will simply move from large cathedrals and ancient churches to houses and adapted premises and will continue its activities, only in more modest conditions. And in occupied and frontline territories — and not only there (for example, in Odesa or Mykolaiv regions) — it, at least for now, does not feel any legal or physical discomfort at all.

Undoubtedly, the initiators of the Law and its active implementers believed that in this way it would be possible to quickly and easily eradicate the “Muscovite vermin” (to paraphrase S. Petliura) from the Ukrainian religious environment. But it is obvious that this is not the case. The pro-Moscow element will not disappear thanks to the Law. And having moved from central churches to more modest places, it will not become less dangerous or harmful. At the same time, with certain losses for the sympathizers of Russia (who constitute at most a few percent of the UOC clergy), along with them, completely innocent people will suffer — conscious citizens, patriots, who together with everyone else work for the good of Ukraine and for its victory. Their only “fault” lies in the fact that in their Church there are also those who are zombified by Moscow.

So is it truly right to apply the principle of collective responsibility? Or would it perhaps be more correct to choose another path for solving the problem — one that may seem more difficult to some than the implementation of the said law? Although even the MP herself admits that the chosen path is very difficult and ineffective.

A quite complicated but, in my opinion, the only correct path in the present situation should be not the accusation of a particular religious structure as a whole, but the search for and neutralization of individual criminals in cassocks (or without cassocks). Moreover, there is no special need to search for them — the internet is full of “preachers” who are candidates for specific criminal or at least administrative charges. In hundreds (if not thousands) of parishes and monasteries of the UOC, during worship the name of “the great lord and father Kirill” is commemorated — and what? Everything continues as before.

Were the parishioners of the Kyiv Lavra guilty that its abbot cursed anyone he disliked and openly displayed his love for Russia? Then why were they deprived of the opportunity to pray in the monastery of Anthony and Theodosius, with which they primarily associated their chosen place of communion with God? Were the believers of St. Michael’s Cathedral guilty, who together with the late Metropolitan Sofronii built this church and through it found their path to God and their place of meeting with Him? They did not choose for themselves a pro-Moscow inadequate person to replace their departed archpastor. Then why were they traumatized and expelled from their own cathedral?

And finally, are thousands of priests and hundreds of thousands of faithful of the UOC guilty because the Primate of their Church turned out to be completely professionally unfit and with poorly concealed pro-Moscow sympathies? Must they leave their Church only because an unsuccessfully chosen leader (not by them!) ten years ago is leading it into a dead end? Perhaps it would have been better if the authorities had helped him leave both the Church and Ukraine altogether, thus solving a major problem for everyone?

An Alternative Path: Stavropegion of the Ecumenical Patriarchate

“There are many priests of the Moscow Patriarchate who are worthy people. And a year or two ago they began to think about alternative options for how to separate themselves from the UOC MP. This will take time… If we want peace, we need to look for options,” the MP noted at the end of the interview.

Yes, it is not a secret to anyone that a significant part of the UOC clergy would more easily leave this structure, but they do not do so because they do not see a worthy alternative in the OCU and therefore simply have nowhere to go. Now, to bring at least some peace into the inter-church environment, the time has come for the authorities to persuade Constantinople once again to meet the Ukrainian people halfway, allowing those who wish to enter the Stavropegion of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Ukraine, which has existed since 2018.

Yes, this would not solve the problem of the division of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. But one must be realistic and understand that in the near future it will not become unified. However, if the clergy of the UOC obtain the opportunity to enter the Stavropegion, thousands of priests (including hierarchs) would take advantage of it, and this would significantly weaken pro-Moscow positions in Ukraine’s religious sphere.

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