Natallia Vasilevich, Human Rights Advocate (Belarus, Germany), Coordinator of the NGO “Christian Vision”
Thank you for inviting me to this webinar-conference. I will speak in Belarusian and hope that all participants will understand. My topic is the crisis of Ukrainian Orthodoxy from a European perspective.
General Context
For over two decades, I have been involved with the Conference of European Churches (CEC), an ecumenical organization that unites Orthodox, Protestant, and Anglican churches. This organization provides a platform for dialogue on various issues facing churches and societies in Europe, helping to formulate and address these problems. It allows different European churches, including minority churches, to meet and discuss pressing and current issues. CEC serves as a representative forum where church sentiments and approaches to specific issues are clearly expressed. The organization collaborates with the Council of Catholic Bishops’ Conferences of Europe, European institutions, and national church councils.
Within this organization and on the European stage in general, prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian Christianity, particularly Ukrainian Orthodoxy, was never widely represented. For a long time, the only Ukrainian church in CEC was the Transcarpathian Reformed Church, an ethno-confessional Protestant church of the Calvinist tradition comprising members of the Hungarian national minority. Representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) were also included in the delegations of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), but the ROC ceased active cooperation with European churches in 2008, later ending participation in CEC and severing relations with partner churches in bilateral dialogues. Since 2014, the UOC-MP has informally, without ROC mediation, sent its participants to CEC events. In 2007, there was a single attempt by a delegation from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) to participate in the European Ecumenical Assembly in Sibiu through the mediation of Georgian Baptists, but since the UOC-KP representatives did not speak foreign languages, their participation was limited.
For the European Christian community, it was no secret that Ukrainian Orthodoxy since the early 1990s had been marred by severe internal conflicts and schisms. Orthodox Christians in Ukraine were not homogeneous—there were always conflicts, confrontations, and misunderstandings. However, since the pan-Orthodox consensus and the position of the Ecumenical Patriarchate regarding Ukrainian Orthodoxy until 2018 were unequivocally in support of the UOC-MP, this church was considered a potential participant in the ecumenical movement, and contacts were maintained with it. A significant place in the ecumenical landscape was occupied by the publishing house “Dukh i Litera” and its associated projects—the Kyiv Summer Theological Institute in Lishnya. Students from the UOC-MP studied in foreign educational institutions, which also facilitated the development of contacts.
Maidan and Hybrid War
In March 2015, after the events of the Maidan, the annexation of Crimea, and the start of the hybrid war in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, Ukraine was visited by a representative ecumenical organization, which included the then-president of CEC, Anglican Bishop Christopher Hill. As noted in the communiqué adopted following the visit, it was organized by the UOC-MP.
The communiqué also noted the following conclusions:
- The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) plays a key role in seeking peace, unity, and reconciliation. As the majority church in Ukraine—with parishioners in all parts of the country and on both sides of the conflict line—and having officially declared and confirmed its commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and unity, the UOC has special opportunities and leadership responsibilities in this regard.
- The delegation also met with the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (AUCCRO), which encompasses almost all church traditions represented in Ukraine, as well as Muslim and Jewish communities. The delegation emphasized the importance of AUCCRO in the collective work of churches and religious communities for a just and sustainable peace in Ukraine. The unified voice and testimony of churches and religious communities—through AUCCRO—for peace and reconciliation in Ukraine were and will be very much needed.
However, the conflict was generally described through the rhetoric of “competing nationalisms,” and the role of the Russian Orthodox Church and Russia at the beginning of this conflict was ignored: the ecumenical audience avoided considering this conflict as hybrid aggression. Personally, I had to make a series of reports with a comprehensive analysis of the state of human rights and freedom of religion in the annexed Crimea and the territories of the self-proclaimed republics, as well as on the role of the Russian Orthodox Church and religious narratives in hybrid aggression. From my experience, I can say that the ecumenical audience received such information rather indifferently.
Moreover, the European ecumenical movement included churches and individuals who propagated pro-Russian propaganda narratives—in particular, a certain role in this was played by a project on violations of the rights and freedoms of Orthodox Christians in Europe, carried out by the Strasbourg office of the Russian Orthodox Church (headed by Hegumen Filaret Ryabykh). The project was implemented from 2014 to 2017. Representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church also actively raised problematic issues of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, mostly through the prism of Russian propaganda narratives. One of the main tasks at this stage was to interrupt disinformation and deconstruct propaganda, which was quite difficult without the availability of materials on each case. However, starting from 2014, a sense of deep tension within Ukrainian Orthodoxy, especially between the UOC-MP and the UOC-KP, gradually began to form.
Formation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU)
In 2018, the situation began to change, due to several factors.
First, the creation of the OCU and the breakdown of the pan-Orthodox consensus regarding the internal dynamics of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Although the OCU largely inherited the Kyiv Patriarchate, thanks to the legitimacy granted to it by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, it began to be perceived as a potential participant in ecumenical projects.(Википедия)
Second, the growing isolation of the UOC-MP concerning the ecumenical movement, the low relevance of this international platform for church leadership—the participation of UOC-MP representatives becomes, in fact, a private initiative of specific figures.
Third, the transition of several key individuals and projects involved in the ecumenical movement from the UOC-MP to the OCU.
However, this did not lead to any significant changes in the Ukrainian presence in the ecumenical movement. The ecumenical audience observed the Ukrainian situation mostly from a distance, drawing information from those specific individuals they trusted. Ukrainian Orthodoxy was perceived as a territory of conflicts, but the conflicts rather appeared as a chronic disease, which could not be dealt with, caused by the very dynamics of life. Moreover, from 2020, the pandemic began, and issues related to the pandemic came to the forefront, while other issues lost their relevance.
The Beginning of the Full-Scale Invasion and European Ecumenism
At the very beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European ecumenical community remained in the same tendency: to consider the war as an escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, caused by internal contradictions in Ukrainian society.
At this moment, the statement of Metropolitan Onufriy (Berezovsky) of Kyiv, UOC-MP, as well as the testimony of Archpriest Mykola Danylevych, who was quite well known in the ecumenical movement, became key to formulating the ecumenical community’s reaction in Europe to the war. In their statements, they unequivocally condemned Russian aggression, expressed a patriotic position regarding Ukraine, denied any possibility of interpreting the beginning of the full-scale invasion as the defense of the Orthodox UOC-MP, and placed responsibility for the start of the war on the government of the Russian Federation and personally on President Vladimir Putin.
In the spring and autumn of 2022, most Ukrainian Orthodox speakers presented a coordinated position and often from the same platform: their criticism in the ecumenical arena was primarily directed at the Russian leadership, which initiated brutal and ruthless aggression, as well as at the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, which supported this aggression. Positions were expressed regarding the need for international solidarity in Ukraine’s fight against external aggression. The conflict within Ukrainian Orthodoxy became less obvious, or rather, overcoming conflicting agendas and uniting in one voice, despite existing tensions. Such a unified testimony contributed to the formation of a European ecumenical consensus in support of Ukraine, its sovereignty and territorial integrity, its struggle for self-preservation, as well as in the unequivocal condemnation of the Russian military invasion and the position of the ROC. Any narratives that Russia allegedly “protects the oppressed,” as it tried to present through its propaganda, had no real basis, and it was the voice of the UOC-MP (which, after Feofania in 2022, began to insist on the name UOC, claiming a break in administrative subordination to the ROC) that played a key role in countering this propaganda.
In the first months of the war, the entire Ukrainian society acted as a single organism—this applied to conflicts between political parties and between religious organizations. At this time, Ukrainian Orthodoxy demonstrated unity, which was a very important signal for Europe. It showed that the church can be strong and not divided in the face of aggression. There was also hope for a gradual dialogue and overcoming contradictions between the two jurisdictions, which could contribute to further peaceful and non-violent unification into one church.
Ecumenical Movement and International Representation
Amidst the wave of nationwide internal Orthodox unity in Ukraine, and with the assistance of European ecumenical actors, the Ukrainian agenda for the World Council of Churches (WCC) General Assembly was effectively prepared. The Ukrainian delegation presented a united front; they did not distinguish between representatives of Baptists or the Bible Society. All sat together, speaking with one voice about the events unfolding in Ukraine. This solidarity served as a powerful testament to the global ecumenical movement.
Typically, the Russian delegation plays an active role in such international forums. However, at that moment, they had little to say, as the Ukrainian delegation’s voice was strong and prominent. Despite attempts by the Russian delegation to promote their narratives and hinder the formation of a pro-Ukrainian consensus, the coordinated actions of representatives from both Ukrainian Orthodox churches led to the adoption of a strongly pro-Ukrainian statement regarding the war in Ukraine, avoiding the legitimization of Russian narratives about “eight years of civil war,” among others. Having been directly involved in drafting and promoting this document and engaging with representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), I can attest that the voice of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), on whose behalf the ROC attempted to speak, was particularly challenging for their strategy.
Shift in Balance: Ukraine’s New Religious Policy and European Ecumenism
Since the autumn of 2022, new dynamics have emerged in the participation of the Ukrainian Orthodox population in the European ecumenical movement.
The Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) has become a member of the Conference of European Churches (CEC), opening up broad opportunities to promote Ukrainian issues on the international stage. This direction is primarily pursued at the church leadership level, notably by Metropolitan Yevstratiy (Zorya) of Bila Tserkva. The CEC has initiated the “Pathways to Peace” project, mobilizing the European ecumenical movement to assist Ukraine. Ukrainian Orthodoxy is represented in this initiative by theologian and OCU activist Andriy Smyrnov. However, the OCU’s presence in Europe is not particularly prominent; in the public sphere, its participation in international European activities is limited to a few individuals or is overshadowed by radical elements speaking on behalf of the OCU on social media, often employing hate speech. To overcome this, the OCU needs to present a broader and more trusted circle of church leaders in the ecumenical arena.
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), in turn, continues its strategy of publicly ignoring ecumenical organizations. On one hand, it expects support and solidarity from them; on the other, it refrains from participating in ecumenical processes and events. At most, it does not prevent its lay representatives from participating in ecumenical events to which they are invited. The UOC is a heterogeneous structure, but those within it who are open to dialogue with the European ecumenical community help create a positive image of the UOC in this community. Nevertheless, the participation of UOC representatives on the international stage remains insufficient.
Thus, noticeable imbalances and asymmetries have begun to emerge in the participation of the OCU and UOC in the ecumenical movement.
Another significant asymmetry arose following the adoption of a new policy on religious freedom in Ukraine and the forced transfer (transition or handover) of churches from the UOC’s jurisdiction to that of the OCU. In solidarity with the UOC and in protest against the OCU’s admission to the CEC, several Orthodox churches withdrew from the organization, including the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Among other churches, despite a sincere desire to help Ukraine, a negative image of the OCU is forming, associated not only with heroic resistance to Russian aggression and closeness to its people during times of trial but also with excessive violence, hate speech, and behaviors deemed unacceptable in Christian circles. Sensing these sentiments, official OCU representatives attempt to use conciliatory rhetoric toward the UOC on ecumenical platforms. For instance, in December 2024, speaking at a CEC conference in Warsaw dedicated to just peace, OCU Primate Metropolitan Epiphaniy (Dumenko) stated that he regards UOC Primate Metropolitan Onufriy as a brother, not an enemy.
This also pertains to the law—specifically, the adopted law “On the Protection of the Constitutional Order in the Field of Activities of Religious Organizations.” The presence of concepts in this law that are controversial from the perspective of international standards of freedom of religion, which open the potential for discrimination, is painfully perceived within the ecumenical community. However, European churches currently avoid expressing a harsh critical stance—this is due to their restraint from publicly criticizing Ukraine at this time, while hostilities continue, and their hope that the implementation of this law will not violate freedom of religion or, at least, that such violations will not be systematic and egregious. The situation may change when hostilities end, and when tension in Ukrainian society begins to grow regarding specific implementation measures.
In this context, the potential of those church figures in Ukraine who demonstrate alternative examples—openness to dialogue, practices of solidarity, overcoming toxic behavior patterns, examples that inspire and give hope—attracts significant attention from the European ecumenical community. Even if significant progress has not been achieved, the very attitude toward resolving conflict issues through alternatives to violence or passive aggression arouses interest.
What Aspects Do I Consider Important to Take into Account?
Dialogue and Confrontation
The first issue I find very important is the topic of dialogue. Does a dialogue exist between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU)? In reality, it does not. Instead of dialogue, there is ongoing discursive confrontation.
The identity of both churches is largely built through opposition to each other. Each side focuses on confrontation rather than creating a positive agenda. In everyday life and on social media, this confrontation only intensifies. However, such conflicts rarely lead to changes in opinion and more often escalate tensions.
Each side has a list of grievances against the other, and often dialogue does not begin but ends with the presentation of this list, frequently including a mechanism of collective guilt—for example, any representative of the UOC, even one who cannot influence the position of their church’s leadership, is forced to complain about the ambiguity of this leadership’s position and is held accountable for it. This means that any representative of the OCU, including those who did not participate in any violent seizures, is accused of the actions of others whose behavior they also cannot influence.
In moments of attack, the mechanism of needing to defend one’s own is also activated, even if one disagrees with their position, but this is how the system works, whose main structure is jurisdictional identity and inter-jurisdictional confrontation.
All this leads to Ukraine being assessed in Europe, among other things, based on media conflicts, where it is not always clear where bots spreading waves of insults and hate speech are, and where real people are simply channeling their emotions on social media and in the media. Unfortunately, 80% of content about Orthodoxy in Ukraine consists of inter-jurisdictional conflicts, mutual accusations, and violence around churches. We need to understand that every post we make on Facebook contributes to this content, and by participating in such conflicts, we create not only a negative image of our competitor or people we disagree with but also a controversial image of ourselves. Entire projects are created that make a living by generating negative content, collecting compromising materials, tracking every word and action of people who do not fit into the mainstream, and then persecuting them, disguising it as humor. This creates a toxic atmosphere.
Moving Beyond the Logic of Confrontation: Practices of Dialogue
In this context, the responsibility of anyone offering an alternative to the mainstream, such as the “Sophia Brotherhood,” increases.
Members of the Brotherhood should refrain from providing a platform for radical ideas and speakers and be cautious in expressing themselves on social media and in the media, trying to avoid participation in heated discussions.
It is necessary to use resources sparingly and strive to create platforms for dialogue where possible, but not where it is still impossible, expanding the practice of mutual understanding to new and increasingly complex and controversial areas and topics. Emotions, time, and mental activity for discussing arguments are important and limited resources that are better spent on capacity building, education, and creating intellectual or cultural products.
Genuine Solidarity and Self-Criticism
True solidarity is not only about supporting one’s own people. Genuine solidarity arises when we are capable of defending even those we considered our competitors or opponents. This is a truly Christian principle. In Ukrainian Orthodoxy, there have already been instances where representatives of different church structures have stood up for each other.
But self-criticism is also important. Orthodoxy often lacks sufficient space for self-criticism, as any critical thought can be perceived as an attack. However, a community that is not afraid to analyze and correct its own mistakes only becomes stronger.
Therefore, in my opinion, it is best to create a system of dialogue in which criticism of a particular jurisdiction would come from representatives of that jurisdiction themselves, as it would be within their competence.
Ukraine’s Role in Europe
If Ukrainians speak only about Ukrainian issues on the international stage, it is natural — but not enough. Europe is built on the idea of the common good, and that’s why it is important to engage in discussions of pan-European problems.
The war in Ukraine is not just a Ukrainian issue — it’s a problem for all of Europe. Whether it’s an ecological crisis in another country or the rise of right-wing populism, Ukrainians should also show interest and solidarity. This is how trust is built and hierarchies are overcome: we solve our common problems together.
Issues of National Minorities
The Transcarpathian Reformed Church of Hungarian tradition has a strong voice in Europe. But within Ukraine, there is a perception that they are more focused on Hungary and Viktor Orbán than on Ukrainian interests. Any minority is important, and its situation influences the broader international context. Dialogue with such churches is crucial for formulating a shared Ukrainian agenda.
Religious Freedom
In 2022, the UOC did not raise the issue of religious freedom on the international stage, although some dissatisfaction was already being voiced regarding changes to the status quo and the practice of banning or restricting the activities of this church in certain regions. At the time, the main focus of religious freedom concerns was on the situation in the occupied territories, and on the Russian aggression itself.
Today, the UOC naturally responds to changes in state policy, but rather than further distancing itself from the ROC, it is demonstrating reduced loyalty and an increasing attempt to use international support and audiences to protect its own rights and interests. Russia, along with political and civil groups invested in tarnishing Ukraine’s image, also actively exploits this topic in its anti-Ukrainian rhetoric.
Other churches, on the contrary, are compelled to dedicate a large portion of their international and ecumenical discourse to promoting a positive image of Ukraine as a country with a high level of religious freedom and democracy — in effect, defending the new law or state policies.
Academic and Cultural Initiatives
Dialogue between the two jurisdictions can also take place not around divisive topics, but around unifying ones — where tension and confrontation are minimal — and around individuals who are open to dialogue and capable of speaking with representatives of other jurisdictions without always presenting a list of grievances in each conversation.
For Ukrainian churches, such themes may include education, culture, and the arts. Churches should be interested in sending students abroad for studies, supporting academic research, and fostering cultural projects. Unfortunately, we sometimes face the problem in Ukraine that it’s even difficult to find people who are willing to take advantage of scholarships.
Conclusion
I thank you for the opportunity to speak. I don’t want to appear like a mentor giving instructions. I’m genuinely interested in hearing your thoughts: how do you see these processes? What pressure points do you notice in your own experience? I hope this discussion will bring new insights. Thank you sincerely!