Part of the “Thoughts Aloud” mini-series created jointly by the “Sofia Brotherhood” and the German foundation Renovabis, within the project “Contemporary Ukrainian Orthodoxy: Breaking Myths for Reconciliation and Societal Consolidation.” Statements do not necessarily represent the official view of the Sofia Brotherhood.
Priest Serhiy Prokopchuk, UOC (Sarny Diocese)
Recently, on the air of the television channel Espreso, the well-known religious scholar Andriy Kovalyov raised the issue of the possibility of establishing in Ukraine an Exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. According to the expert, it is precisely this new jurisdiction that could unite within itself that part of the UOC which does not wish to have anything in common with the Russian Orthodox Church. The same topic was thoroughly discussed on the Viche channel by the religious scholar Liudmyla Fylypovych and the theologian Serhiy Bortnyk (UOC). This subject was not ignored either by some notorious media outlets close to the UOC.
Is Andriy Kovalyov’s proposal for the establishment of an Exarchate in Ukraine realistic? And how do the UOC, the OCU, and the state regard this idea? What could prompt the Ecumenical Patriarch to such a step? Let us try to understand.
The question of establishing an Exarchate in Ukraine has arisen long ago. At various times there have been differing assessments of this idea within the UOC, the OCU, and state circles. How is this idea perceived within the UOC? The UOC’s spokespersons have been cautious in evaluating the role of the Ecumenical Patriarch in resolving the complex ecclesiastical situation in Ukraine. At the same time, in some media outlets connected with the UOC, the opinion is being promoted that it is Patriarch Bartholomew who bears the greatest blame for the current difficult situation in Ukrainian Orthodoxy. This position is not surprising, since these media outlets clearly sympathize with the Russian Orthodox Church. As for the leadership of the UOC and its episcopate, for a long time even mentioning the possibility of establishing an Exarchate was strictly suppressed. Let us recall that it was precisely for this reason that Archpriest Andriy Pinchuk was prohibited from serving (although the official version was different, those who are informed understand what it was really about).
However, in recent times the rhetoric of the UOC’s Metropolis has somewhat changed. Last year representatives of the UOC agreed to meet with a delegation from the Ecumenical Patriarch, and Metropolitan Onufriy even presented Patriarch Bartholomew with a set of panagias as a gift. Shortly thereafter, one of the well-known UOC theologians, Professor Serhiy Bortnyk, openly voiced the idea of the possible establishment of an Exarchate and the importance of such an option for resolving the problems of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The very fact that such a publication became possible (that is, the censorship of the Metropolis allowed it to pass) demonstrated that among the higher circles of the UOC there is no longer such a categorical reaction to the possibility of communication with Patriarch Bartholomew on this matter. Metropolitan Onufriy also alluded to this indirectly in his address on the occasion of the third anniversary of the Council in Theophany, expressing his hope for moral support from the Local Churches. Clearly, the reference was not to individual Churches, but to the entirety of the Universal Church within which the Patriarch of Constantinople holds a special place. Thus, in the UOC the idea of establishing an Exarchate is not merely in the air. Among a large number of bishops and priests of the UOC there is a great expectation of the Ecumenical Patriarch’s participation in resolving the Church’s problems in Ukraine. The only question is who will be the first to break the taboo on contact with Patriarch Bartholomew: Metropolitan Onufriy, the episcopate, or the lower clergy? It is becoming evident that they are all already on the starting line.
For the OCU, however, the establishment of an Exarchate would be a serious blow to its reputation, as it would confirm the fact of the young Church’s inability to unite Orthodox Ukrainians around the Tomos. Since 2018 both the OCU and the state, in the person of certain of its officials, have determined the mechanism of “transfers” as the main path to the unification of Orthodox Ukrainians. Yet this idea has collapsed – in part because of the coercive element in this mechanism.
To confirm my conclusions, I shall share some of my own observations. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the number of UOC priests who, together with their communities, have decided to join the OCU has been very small. Particularly telling is the statistic concerning the participation in the process of transfers by priests from the well-known group of UOC Signatories. According to our calculations, out of 440 signatories, only about 50 during this period have transferred to the OCU. As for the Sophia Brotherhood (which is accused of allegedly having almost all of its members transfer to the OCU), in the one and a half years of the organization’s existence only two of its members have made such a decision. From the total number of Signatories and Brotherhood members this percentage is quite small.
It is unrealistic to expect that under the pressure of the law the clergy of the UOC will rush to the OCU. The reasons are various – and the so-called “Muscovite spirit” of UOC priests is by no means the main one. It must be acknowledged that within the OCU many are concerned that with the creation of an Exarchate the process of developing the Local Ukrainian Church may stall and the very idea of the independence of Ukrainian Orthodoxy may be nullified. People fear that the movement toward Autocephaly, to which many Ukrainians have dedicated their lives, will slow down. Given the influence and pressure from the Russian Orthodox Church and the complexity of the situation within Ukraine itself, this indeed may become a reality. Therefore, the fears regarding the establishment of an Exarchate are also justified.
And what might be the position of the authorities regarding the possibility of establishing an Exarchate? In various government offices there are differing views of how events may unfold, which can be reduced to two main positions. One of them is implemented by the head of the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience, Viktor Yelensky. He is an active representative of those who dream that nothing of the UOC should remain. Their slogan is: “There must be a single Local Church in Ukraine – period.” That is, for representatives of the UOC, allegedly, the only way out remains – to join the OCU.
At the same time, more and more people are beginning to realize that the UOC will not disappear. The state will not be able in a short period and with limited resources to carry out all the actions prescribed by the “prohibition” law. Moreover, there is no understanding of what to do with the bishops, priests, and faithful of the UOC who have a clear pro-Ukrainian stance. To make them into enemies and drive them into the “catacombs” would mean turning against oneself a large number of conscious citizens of Ukraine.
Last autumn the Office of the President organized a visit to Ukraine by a delegation from the Ecumenical Patriarch, during which a number of meetings were held. For obvious reasons Viktor Yelensky and the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience were not involved in this matter. Certain individuals in the Office are trying to resolve the issue of the UOC by engaging the Ecumenical Patriarch in addressing the problems of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. It was then that the question of creating an Exarchate was first prominently raised both in the Greek and in some Ukrainian religious media. Some saw in this a hope, while others suspected a conspiracy.
Does the government now consider the possibility of establishing an Exarchate? One can only speculate. But it can be stated with certainty that without a request from the government for an Exarchate, the Ecumenical Patriarch will not proceed with the creation of a new Orthodox structure in Ukraine. What will the bishops, priests, and faithful of the UOC choose for themselves: the catacombs, or the resolution of the question of canonical status through the Ecumenical Patriarch? What will the state choose for itself: to expel the entire UOC from the public sphere, or to attempt to “save” its pro-Ukrainian part through the establishment of an Exarchate? The questions remain open. And answers to them can be found only through dialogue.