Archpriest Serhii Prokopchuk, Sophia Brotherhood, Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC)
The end of 2025 proved to be particularly active for political and church-political life in Ukraine. Discussions of a peace plan and the presence of a religious component within it have prompted religious experts to pay special attention to this issue and to make certain adjustments in forecasting the development of church–state relations in 2026. This was significantly influenced by the failure of the state’s legislative initiatives regarding the UOC, as well as by changes in the attitude of the expert community toward both Orthodox jurisdictions.
We will attempt to analyze the situation within the UOC and the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and to forecast the possible development of inter-jurisdictional and state–church relations in the coming year.
Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU)
At first glance, the OCU appears to be a fairly monolithic structure led by a young and authoritative Primate, enjoying full support from the state and Ukrainian society. Many positively assess the implementation of the unifying ideas of the Tomos granted seven years ago. However, the situation is far from unambiguous. Increasingly, criticism is being voiced toward the young Church, including regarding attempts to unite Ukrainian Orthodoxy around the Tomos. This has already been openly noted by Patriarch Bartholomew in the address he delivered on January 6, 2026, during a joint prayer with Metropolitan Epiphanius at the Phanar:
“Your Beatitude! The Great Church of Christ, commemorating today this ‘Saturday’ anniversary—the granting by her of an institutional foundation through the gift of an autocephalous order and the signing here of the corresponding Tomos—addresses to you sincere maternal exhortations. She thus points out the path: to exhaust yourselves completely in works of peace; to go out into the squares and streets in order to call the children of God to the banquet of His Kingdom; to seek ways of approaching your fellow bishops in Ukraine through dialogue and the search for common points toward unity; to enlighten the flock with the true aspects and manifestations of this matter.”
Seven years of the existence of the young Local Church, which from its very first days received an enormous credit of trust, have produced disappointing results. The unifying potential of the Tomos was not utilized. The unification of Orthodox Ukrainians did not take place. Even speaking of any rapprochement between representatives of the UOC and the OCU remains merely wishful thinking. Of course, one can blame Moscow’s agents for all problems, but in the inter-jurisdictional confrontation representatives of both Churches bear no less responsibility.
Even the process of transitions, which for the OCU seemed so promising, according to the latest statistics has yielded over four years of war only a modest increase in OCU parishes—1,378 officially registered transitions. The manner in which they took place is a separate topic. Each year a decrease in the number of such transitions has been recorded:
- 2022 – 483
- 2023 – 471
- 2024 – 233
- 2025 – 191
And this is against the backdrop of 9,792 UOC parishes.
Only slightly more than 10% of UOC parishes have transferred or been transferred to the OCU over the past four years. When we speak of the fact of clergy transitions, such cases amount to only several dozen. Against the background of more than a thousand parishes that transitioned, the number of priests is very small. A кадровий (personnel) shortage is already being observed in the OCU. Already now, one priest may serve several parishes. It is clear that the quality of ministry under such conditions leaves much to be desired.
Such a small number of transitions and their further decline have various reasons. One of the main reasons is the image created by the OCU itself as a “militant Church,” called to fight hateful “Muscovites in cassocks.” Often included among the enemies are believers, priests, and bishops of the UOC who openly express a pro-Ukrainian position and actively assist the front. Against the background of constant information about the forcible seizure of churches by supporters of the OCU, the appeals of Patriarch Bartholomew “to exhaust yourselves completely in works of peace; to go out into the squares and streets in order to call the children of God to the banquet of His Kingdom” sound like “the voice of one crying in the wilderness.” And the call “to seek ways of approaching your fellow bishops in Ukraine through dialogue and the search for common points toward unity” seems like a far-reaching dream. It often turns out that with one hand the leadership of the OCU extends itself toward representatives of the UOC for dialogue, while with the other hand it awards well-known radicals and inciters of aggression—odious representatives of its own Church.
The failure of unifying initiatives and a certain radicalization of the OCU’s attitude toward the UOC may have caused a halt in the process of recognition of the young Local Church by other Orthodox Churches. Among clergy and believers of various Local Churches, an opinion is increasingly being heard that if the OCU and the UOC had found a common language and taken steps toward one another, this would have contributed to accelerating the recognition of the OCU among other Local Churches. Unfortunately, in his New Year interview Metropolitan Epiphanius did not mention the importance of dialogue between representatives of both jurisdictions. Instead, he focused on the claim that the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate is dangerous for the state and should not exist in Ukraine:
“I am convinced that over time all Orthodox Ukrainians will be in a single recognized Local Ukrainian Orthodox Church. This is an irreversible process; it is ongoing, but time is needed.”
How much time is needed, given the dynamics of “transitions,” and when full recognition of the OCU will occur, its Primate did not specify.
Assessing seven years since the granting of the Tomos, the well-known religious scholar and OCU priest Andrii Kovalov stated:
“The Tomos is only a start, only a beginning. And in fact, church figures and church hierarchs had very extensive homework. In my view, over these seven years this homework was not completed. The key concept in the Tomos, apart from Autocephaly, is Unity. And it is precisely unity that was not achieved… And this is not only a remark addressed to the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate; it can equally sound as a remark addressed to the hierarchs of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Because this unification has still not been achieved. Today, in the seventh year of this great historical event—the receipt of Autocephaly by the Orthodox Church of Ukraine—Ukrainian society, all Ukrainian Orthodox believers, and the Ukrainian authorities face a very serious challenge: how to implement the Tomos so that all Orthodox in Ukraine become One? How to resolve the issue of the schism that continues to exist in Ukrainian Orthodoxy?”
The criticism voiced toward the OCU by its own clergy and faithful has become yet another challenge for this community. Not everyone in the OCU is pleased with the manner in which UOC communities are being absorbed, as this gradually reshapes the OCU itself, while the leadership of the OCU begins to use newcomers against dissenters from the old autocephalous guard. Questions are being raised as to why the OCU has still not completed the transitions of its associated members into the central structure—there remain many communities under the brands of the UOC-KP and the UAOC.
Will the Church be able to withstand this criticism and respond effectively to the demands of its representatives? Voices of such criticism are being heard from the religious expert community both in Ukraine and in the Greek world, and even from the Ukrainian authorities. Recently, the well-known theologian and OCU believer Yurii Chornomorets, on the YouTube channel “Viche,” assessed the potential of his Church as follows:
“The OCU sees that a negative image has formed in the eyes of believers of the UOC. This negative image is not only the product of propaganda; it is also the result of the fact that from the OCU people see certain disputes around churches and do not see other activity. If, for example, the OCU truly were some beacon of Orthodox thought, enlightenment, and activity, and Metropolitan Epiphanius could say that ‘I have not only sent a thousand vehicles to the front over these years of the great war, but I have also published a thousand books in the Ukrainian language over these years,’ people would see that they are clearly not militants thinking only about seizing churches… Give them twenty Andrii Kuraevs from the OCU, give them some elders from the OCU—and people will see that this is a grace-filled Church, that Kyiv is our second Athos, and that one should unite around this. Create the positive. And this is very important.”
Recently, a cooling in relations between the authorities and the OCU has become increasingly noticeable. There is also no unanimity on various issues within the episcopate of the OCU. One of the problems of the young Church is the significant autonomization of diocesan centers. A crisis in theological education is evident, as well as an insufficient number of examples of high-quality missionary work.
There is also growing irritation among the media, which are either required to write exclusively positive coverage of the OCU and its leadership or face harassment from activists and accusations of Russian financing—as happened, for example, with journalists from one of the heavyweight media outlets, Glavkom, who allowed themselves to publish a critical article about shortcomings in the work of Metropolitan Epiphanius, based on information from government circles.
At present, we can distinguish two groups within the OCU, which include well-known intellectuals, priests, and bishops of the Church. The first group we allow ourselves to call “Unified OCU,” under the leadership of its unchanging Primate, Metropolitan Epiphanius. The immutability of the Primate and radicalism toward the entire UOC are the main features of this group. Dialogue with the UOC here is possible only as a path of “transition” of UOC representatives into the “single canonical” Church in Ukraine—the OCU. The immutability of the Primate is voiced as a “red line” in this dialogue. The creation of any transitional temporary structures for the UOC under the patronage of Patriarch Bartholomew—such as an Exarchate or separate stauropegial parishes—is also deemed unacceptable. This group actively supports legislative initiatives against the UOC and the resolution of property issues in favor of the OCU. At present, we can state that this group is dominant within the OCU, though not the only one.
The second group within the OCU structure can conditionally be called “Conciliar OCU.” This group includes bishops, clergy, and faithful of this Church who believe that the Primate and his assistant, Metropolitan Yevstratii Zoria, have maximally accumulated power within the OCU. Representatives of this group see the solution to the problems of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in the need for a broader understanding of the content of the Tomos and the possibility of holding a second Unification Council. This group includes two well-known OCU hierarchs: Metropolitan Oleksandr Drabynko and Metropolitan Mykhailo Zinkevych. In addition to them, there are other non-public hierarchs and a group of well-known OCU intellectuals.
The division within the OCU is only beginning to become visible, but if a certain scenario develops on Ukraine’s religious map, these groups may enter into public confrontation.
No less threatening are the relations between Metropolitan Epiphanius and the Exarch of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Ukraine, Bishop Mykhailo. The latter is the representative of the Patriarch in Ukraine, and negative relations between him and the head of the OCU cannot but affect Patriarch Bartholomew’s attitude toward the Primate of the young Church.
Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC)
The situation within the UOC is more interesting and dynamic. We have all become accustomed to the names of certain groups within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church: the “commemorators,” the “Theophany group,” the “autocephalists,” the “Onufrians,” and the “signatories.” At first glance, everything seems clear: most experts point to the presence of two main groups of influence within the UOC with radically different views. These are the “commemorators”—those who commemorate Patriarch Kirill and advocate preserving the unity of the UOC with the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC)—and the “Theophany group” or “autocephalists,” who regard the Council in Theophany as the starting point on the path toward full independence (autocephaly) of the UOC.
I do not fully agree with such an assessment of the situation within the UOC and the balance of forces among its groups. Indeed, there is a group of “commemorators” within the UOC, led by three well-known hierarchs: Metropolitan Antonii Pakanych, Metropolitan Feodosii Sniehirov, and Metropolitan Luka Kovalenko. Separately, there is the so-called “Theophany group,” which I would rather call the “Onufrians.” And here is something important that unites these two groups into one large group that currently dominates within the UOC—I will allow myself to call it the “Group of Conditional Unity of the UOC.” The main goal of this large group is the preservation of a monolithic and conditionally unified structure of the UOC. The difference between these subgroups lies only in the fact that the “commemorators” do everything possible to preserve this conditional unity so as not to allow opponents (the OCU and the Ecumenical Patriarchate) to tear away any significant part of the UOC from the ROC.
Metropolitan Onufrii has a somewhat different motivation for preserving the unity of the UOC structure. Metropolitan Onufrii, as it seems to him, stays aside from major church and secular politics. He wants to show that the UOC is the Church of Christ and that he, as Primate, will not take into account political battles, preferences, or individual positions within the UOC. His main goal is to preserve “church unity.” The Primate of the UOC does not look far into the future; he is not particularly concerned with subordination to Moscow or with any particular form of independence for his church structure. What matters most to him is preserving “canonicity” and “unity” at any cost. He sees the preservation of the canonicity of the UOC in maintaining, even if nominal, unity with the ROC. And he sees “church unity” itself in maintaining the unity of the UOC structure, without being particularly concerned by the lack of Eucharistic communion with four Local Churches with which the UOC once severed relations. No attempts to restore inter-Orthodox unity have taken place over the past four years.
It is precisely the value of these two postulates—“canonicity” and “unity”—that unites two groups of the UOC episcopate, clergy, and faithful that are opposite in content: the “commemorators” and the “Onufrians.” Bishops of both groups, despite their significant differences, demonstratively affirm their unity with one another and their common solidarity. This conditional integrity of the UOC’s church structure is placed above the interests of Ukrainian Orthodoxy and Ukrainian society, and even above the interests of global Orthodoxy. Even such an important unity of Ukrainians as the defense of their country and their lives is not taken into account. The leadership of the UOC continues to choose “canonical and Eucharistic unity” with the heretical and immoral ROC, neglecting the possibility and importance of restoring unity with part of the Orthodox world.
Metropolitan Onufrii uses three main instruments to ensure this conditional unity:
- A position of silence. He almost never expresses evaluative judgments on controversial and heated church issues so as not to say anything superfluous that might upset one of the groups. He himself remains silent and strongly advises the episcopate not to speak unnecessarily. The information work of the UOC is reduced to a minimum, and its representatives are not allowed to participate in various dialogue initiatives. All this silence creates the illusion of unity in a common Church position and of episcopal support for the Primate’s course.
- Guarantees of internal security for the episcopate. Everything is forgiven, everyone is thanked, everyone is rewarded, and everyone is granted full freedom of action—except in matters related to the integrity of the UOC structure. In recent years, there has not been a single case of punishment of a ruling or auxiliary hierarch for any offenses. Even open collaborators do not receive condemnation or an objective assessment of their actions. Metropolitan Ionafan of Yelets even received a blessing from Metropolitan Onufrii for an exchange and for a long time after the exchange continued to be listed as a ruling hierarch. At the same time, there is the example of Metropolitan Antonii Fialko of the Khmelnytskyi diocese, who was removed from diocesan governance the very next day after he voiced the possibility of unification with the OCU. The unity of the structure is sacred. Everything else is secondary.
- Persecution of the UOC. “We must be united because we are being persecuted.”
Indeed, in recent years the state has exerted pressure on the UOC. Some churches and monastic complexes—architectural monuments—have been taken away by the authorities. The situation has been further inflamed by repeated cases of cynical “seizure” (raider takeovers) of churches by the OCU with the support of local authorities. The leadership of the UOC presents all this as “persecution for the faith.” At the same time, facts of genuine persecution, the “seizure” of entire dioceses, and the persecution of UOC clergy by Russian authorities in the occupied territories are completely ignored. The real reason for the so-called “persecution” by the Ukrainian authorities is also concealed—the affiliation of the UOC with the ROC, the canonical link of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with the “Mother Church in Moscow.” The faithful, clergy, and episcopate of the UOC suffer precisely because of the unwillingness of the UOC leadership to make a complete break with the ROC and to seek ways of canonically regulating the status of the UOC. Over four years of war, there has not been a single public attempt to establish relations with the one who could truly help the UOC fully sever ties with the ROC and avoid falling into a canonical “gray zone”—the Ecumenical Patriarch. This inactivity of Metropolitan Onufrii and the Synod of the UOC is convincing evidence of their unwillingness to break ties with the ROC, while it is convenient to label the demands of society and the state regarding ties with Moscow as “persecution.”
Metropolitan Onufrii wants to show that he and his Church are apolitical. But he does not wish to notice that such a position only further makes the UOC an object of major political battles. This is understandable in a situation where Putin lists “the protection of the canonical UOC” as one of the objectives of the war and includes it as a point in a peace agreement. Metropolitan Onufrii has repeatedly emphasized that until the end of the war he will not consider the issue of changing the canonical status of the UOC. In this, he is supported by representatives of both the “commemorators” and the “Onufrians.” The leadership of the UOC is ready to lose yet another portion of parishes, to bid farewell to mobilized priests and even bishops, in order to preserve structural unity and a dubious (against the backdrop of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, blessed by Patriarch Kirill) canonicity.
It is worth noting that the Council in Theophany, immediately after it was held, united the pro-Ukrainian wing within the UOC. Over time, however, this pro-Ukrainian potential was lost. For many it became clear that Metropolitan Onufrii was not prepared to make any radical changes. Everything stopped at a declarative break with the ROC. Some participants of the Council accepted this and joined the “Group of Conditional Unity of the UOC.” The most active group of “signatories” disintegrated. Some became disillusioned with the UOC and transferred to the OCU. After the easing of state pressure at the end of 2025, the “Group of Conditional Unity of the UOC” became even stronger and larger. The “commemorators” came to dominate within it. They raised their heads against the backdrop of possible protection of the UOC within a peace agreement. The state was unable to bring to completion court cases against some of their leaders. And Metropolitan Antonii Pakanych began to restore his influence over the UOC episcopate.
At the same time, among the episcopate, clergy, and faithful, a group began to stand out that desires concrete actions toward establishing dialogue with the Ecumenical Patriarch and other Local Churches on the issue of regulating the canonical status of the UOC. Archbishop Sylvester Stoichev publicly voiced such a desire. He is supported in this by a certain group of bishops. Particularly active in this direction are young protégés of Metropolitan Agafangel of Odesa. It is precisely the Odesa diocese that in recent years has become a center of Ukrainian identity within the UOC and an initiator of many actions that may testify to a desire for a complete break with the ROC and the establishment of relations with Patriarch Bartholomew and the Ukrainian authorities.
This group is called “autocephalists,” since its media leader, Archbishop Sylvester, publicly voiced the need for the UOC to achieve autocephaly. I would call this group differently—“the group for unity with Ecumenical Orthodoxy.”
The fact is that for some bishops and priests, the topic of autocephaly is merely an external screen, an unattainable dream, a chance that the UOC lost back in 2018. Representatives of this group understand the unrealistic nature of this path and are therefore more inclined toward obtaining from Patriarch Bartholomew a special status for the UOC: an exarchate or autonomy. Of course, no one from the UOC episcopate voices these plans publicly, as they fear condemnation from the “Group of Conditional Unity of the UOC” and even possible disciplinary actions from Metropolitan Onufrii. This topic is discussed more openly by the grassroots clergy of the UOC. It is priests who openly express the desire to appeal to Patriarch Bartholomew as a canonical arbiter. In most cases, ruling hierarchs do not condemn such discussions and quietly support the idea. The topic of creating an exarchate or granting autonomy to part of the UOC by the Ecumenical Patriarch has become a top issue in recent months both in Ukrainian church media and abroad. Unfortunately, however, nothing goes beyond discussion. There is still insufficient strong will among the UOC episcopate to publicly voice a demand to the UOC leadership to restore dialogue with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and other Local Churches. And the faithful do not yet fully understand that, having severed canonical ties with the ROC (as Metropolitan Onufrii declares) and not having joined another Local Church, the UOC is increasingly sliding into schism.
If to this factor one adds the “catacomb Church” complex, a rapid process of marginalization of the UOC and its transformation into a sect-type religious community becomes visible. There remains hope for the activation of a grassroots movement of clergy, who best see and understand the processes taking place within the UOC. We await developments with the understanding that time is not on the side of the UOC. At present, a window of opportunity has opened for establishing contacts with the authorities and relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Will the UOC miss this opportunity?
To be continued.