Софійське Братство – громадська організація

The Path to Autocephaly: The Ukrainian Church’s Struggle — and Lessons We Must Learn to Avoid Repeating History

Protopriest Vitalii Kuzmych, St. Sophia Brotherhood

The fight of the Ukrainian Church for autocephaly, and the lessons Ukrainians must learn so history does not repeat itself.

In the 20th century, Ukrainian Orthodoxy repeatedly embarked on the path of independence from the Moscow religious center. That journey was overshadowed by political repression, external meddling, and internal schisms. The history of the autocephalous movement in Ukraine can be divided into three distinct stages:

The First UAPC Revival in 1921: Autocephaly Under the UPR Banner

After the fall of the Russian Empire and the declaration of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR), the Orthodox hierarchy in Ukraine remained entirely subordinate to the Moscow Patriarchate, which firmly rejected any notion of Ukrainian Church independence.

Most bishops on Ukrainian sees were Russian imperial appointees, hostile to Ukrainian national rights. A prominent example was Metropolitan Antonii Khrapovitsky, a renowned theologian and strong opponent of Ukrainian ecclesiastical autonomy. He condemned the use of Ukrainian in liturgy and branded every such initiative “schism and unrest.” Khrapovitsky later became head of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCOR), which persisted in not recognizing any Ukrainian church independence until the end of the 20th century.

Amid this hostile environment, Ukrainian clergy and faithful committed to national revival formed the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPC). In October 1921, an All-Ukrainian Church Council in Kyiv declared the creation of the UAPC, electing Vasyl Lypkivsky as its first Metropolitan—a staunch advocate for Ukrainian ecclesial self-determination.

To attain canonical episcopal ordination, the UAPC delegation sought support from the Georgian Orthodox Church, which itself was fighting for its autocephaly. While initial negotiations were hopeful, Soviet pressure ultimately forced the Georgian hierarchy to withdraw. Left with no alternative, the UAPC initiated a “council ordination” of its bishops—a canonically contested act where priests and laity consecrated their own hierarch. Though this enabled ecclesiastical life to begin, no other local churches recognized it.

The UPR in exile supported the UAPC as an expression of ecclesiastical independence, but Soviet repression followed. In 1937, Metropolitan Lypkivsky was executed, and the UAPC was nearly eradicated within Soviet Ukraine.

Polish Autocephaly: National Ambitions and State Support

Following the Treaty of Riga in 1921, Western Ukrainian lands became part of the Second Polish Republic. The Orthodox Church came under Polish control, yet formally remained part of the Russian Church.

Polish authorities, seeking to challenge Moscow’s influence, backed Ukrainian ecclesial independence—a policy fiercely opposed by Russian clergy in Poland. In 1923, Archimandrite Smaragd Latyshenkov, a zealous ROC figure, assassinated Metropolitan Yurii Yaroshevskyi, Moscow’s chosen Exarch of Poland. The act highlighted that autocephaly was not merely theological, but deeply political and national.

Thanks to the united efforts of Polish authorities and local clergy, Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory VII recognized the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church in 1924, led by Metropolitan Dionysius Valedynsky.

Despite early challenges, the Polish Church became a key hub for Ukrainian clergy:

  • Polycarp Sikorsky — later head of the UAPC in 1942
  • Oleksii Hromadskyi — future leader of the Autonomous Ukrainian Church
  • Ivan Inozemtsev — theologian and spiritual leader in Volhynia
  • Mstyslav Skrypnyk — nephew of Symon Petliura, later Patriarch of Kyiv and All Ukraine and head of the UAPC in the diaspora

The 1942 UAPC Revival During WWII

With the onset of the German–Soviet war, ecclesiastical life in Ukraine revived. In June 1942, in Pinsk, under the blessing of Polish Metropolitan Dionysius, the UAPC was re-established, led by Metropolitan Polycarp Sikorsky, who received canonical ordination from the Polish Church.

New UAPC bishops—Nikanor Abramovych, Ioan Ohienko, and Mstyslav Skrypnyk—were canonically ordained, granting this iteration greater legitimacy than the 1921 version. The Church operated under the dual pressures of the German authorities, wary of Ukrainian nationalism, and pro-Russian clerics. Despite this, the UAPC gained substantial support across Volhynia, Polissia, Kyiv, and Podillia. After the war, some hierarchs perished under Soviet rule, while others emigrated to Europe and America.

Metropolitan Oleksii Hromadskyi’s Autonomous Church: Moscow Alignment

Alongside the UAPC, a so-called Autonomous Orthodox Church in Ukraine emerged under Metropolitan Oleksii Hromadskyi—formerly a bishop of the Polish Church yet loyal to Moscow. It claimed “temporary autonomy” during wartime but maintained canonical ties to the Russian Church, even after internal upheavals within the ROC.

Hromadskyi advocated maintaining unity with the “mother church,” despite Moscow having lost practical control over Ukraine. His supporters included some former ROC bishops who viewed the UAPC as a political threat. This autonomist model laid the groundwork for the creation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) in 1990, led first by Metropolitan Filaret, followed by Metropolitans Volodymyr Sabodan and currently Onufrii Berezovskyi.

Contemporary Parallels: OCU vs. UOC

Today’s Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), granted a Tomos of Autocephaly in 2019, is the culmination of centuries-long efforts for recognition and self-governance by the UAPC. Meanwhile, the UOC–MP, despite nominal autonomy, reflects Hromadskyi’s autonomy-within-Moscow model: hierarchical, canonically tied to the ROC, and thus not fully independent.

Conclusion: Autocephaly as a Matter of Historical Justice and Freedom

Autocephaly for the Ukrainian Church is not just a canonical matter—it is a question of spiritual freedom for our people. History shows that each generation of Ukrainian Orthodox believers had to fight anew to be themselves.

Today, the OCU is not merely a new institution—it is the apex of the struggle of millions of persecuted faithful and hundreds of thousands of clergy who refused to remain part of a foreign empire’s system. Thus, choosing autocephaly is not schism—it is a restoration of authentic history.

Now, with war again raging, the Church faces the same crossroads as its predecessors: to stand with its people or remain in the shadow of foreign domination. History should not repeat itself—if we have learned its lessons.

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