Archpriest Serhii Prokopchuk, Sophia Brotherhood, Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC)
Continuation.
Beginning — Part 1
The Ukrainian Authorities and the Church Question
In 2023, President V. Zelensky set the task of resolving the issue of the activity of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Ukraine. The main goal of this task was to do everything possible to detach the UOC from the ROC, so that there would be no religious organizations in Ukraine subordinated (affiliated) to the aggressor state. A process was launched to ban the activity of the ROC in Ukraine. Discussion of legislative initiatives on this matter began.
But, as often happens in Ukraine, a strategic task that is truly very important for the country was taken up by politicians. After discussion and revision of the presidential draft law in the Verkhovna Rada, deputies adopted draft law No. 8371, which the public nicknamed “the law on banning the UOC.” After 17 months of its functioning, everyone understood that it was “a puff of smoke.” But this was not just “a puff of smoke”: the law not only failed to detach the UOC from the ROC or to ban the ROC’s activity in Ukraine, it also provoked even greater activation of Russian and pro-Russian forces both in Ukraine and abroad. In addition, it triggered a wave of criticism from international organizations and Ukraine’s partners. A good assessment of the story with this law was offered by a member of the expert council under the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience (DESS), Yurii Chornomorets:
“The State Service for Ethnopolitics submitted a very simple law, one and a half pages, on this whole topic, and it would have been possible to adopt that simple law and already in the spring of 2023 have concrete legal consequences for the UOC-MP. No — the deputies took it and turned it into some kind of PR, crammed in provisions from Kniazhytskyi’s draft law, someone else invented something else, wrote everything out in detail. They made such a law that it is very difficult to implement.”
Some civil servants, politicians, and religious figures wanted to use this story of the legislative ban of the UOC for their own interests: to settle scores with the UOC and to “transfer” it en masse to the OCU. The property issue occupied an important place in this process. As a result, inter-jurisdictional confrontation deepened even further, dialogue between the authorities and the leadership of the UOC was completely halted, and the UOC further cemented its connection with the ROC. Preserving the unity of the UOC in the status in which it exists became the priority for the Church’s leadership. The task set by the president for the relevant services was failed. And the radical initiatives of the authorities received a warning from Patriarch Bartholomew. In his Address on January 6, 2026, he noted:
“We unconditionally condemn extremism, wherever it may come from. We advise state bodies to refrain from interference in internal church affairs.”
At the end of the fourth year of the war in Ukraine, the idea of the “Russian world” and the importance of unity with Moscow continues to be glorified, through the mouths of some odious hierarchs of the UOC. Moscow is intensifying its actions in the direction of religious policy. In the new edition of the text of the peace plan, Russia put forward a point about the “protection of canonical Orthodoxy in Ukraine (the UOC).” If this point is fixed in the final version of the peace agreement, it will testify to the inability of the Ukrainian authorities to limit the influence of the aggressor in Ukraine through the religious sphere. The UOC may not only remain under the umbrella of the ROC, but may also fully dissolve into it.
Forecast for 2026
OCU
There is no reason to hope for a change in the OCU’s approaches to resolving the church question in Ukraine. Although in recent months the number of forceful seizures of UOC churches by representatives of the OCU has decreased, the militant rhetoric among its representatives has not diminished. The OCU leadership has determined its strategy toward the UOC: demonizing it as a dangerous “Moscow agent” and taking radical actions to improve statistical indicators of the number of OCU parishes. The longed-for unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, given such a strategy, is postponed for an indefinite time, and the admonitions of Patriarch Bartholomew will be ignored.
UOC
In the situation in which the UOC has found itself, there is no reason at present to expect any radical changes. For the episcopate, clergy, and faithful of this community, it has become obvious that the authorities have effectively failed in their attempt to pressure the UOC through the “ban law.” As bitter as it may sound, part of the UOC is impatiently awaiting external protection within the framework of a possible peace agreement in which the UOC-MP will be mentioned directly or indirectly. For the “Group of Conditional Unity of the UOC,” this significantly increases the chances of preserving the integrity of the structure, at least for some time.
At the same time, one should not forget another group within the UOC — the one that will never reconcile itself to the reality of the unity of the UOC with the ROC, especially if such unity is fixed or legitimized in a potential peace agreement in the form of a Russian protectorate. Within the UOC there is a strong internal demand for a complete break with the ROC. Within the community it has long been understood that real internal unity of the UOC no longer exists, and this at all levels — from the episcopate to individual parishes. Everywhere there are groups with opposing views on fundamental questions of the life of the Church. It is becoming increasingly difficult to mold everyone into one whole.
The coalition of bishops “for the conditional unity of the UOC” may fall apart at any moment. If at the level of the UOC episcopate there still remains the possibility of publicly demonstrating unity (joint public services), then at the parish level the split has long since occurred. The parishes of the “commemorators” and the “autocephalists” have a minimal level of communication among themselves, and in certain cases there is not even concelebration between them. The UOC faces a split into two parts, the core of which will be clearly expressed pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian parties. The main question is: where will Metropolitan Onufrii himself and his admirers — the “Onufrians,” who constitute the majority in the UOC — align? The majority of the bishops, clergy, and faithful of the UOC still trust their Primate and will follow him. Fixing the idea of the “protection of the UOC” in a peace agreement will strengthen the pro-Moscow party and will cause the restoration of the ROC’s influence over the UOC. The restoration of dialogue between the UOC and the Ecumenical Patriarchate can neutralize the ROC’s attempt to bring the UOC “to attention” through a peace agreement and will bring the UOC closer to real independence from the ROC.
At the same time, without a change in state policy regarding the establishment of systematic dialogue with the UOC, achieving a real break of at least part of the UOC with the ROC will be extremely difficult. Mutual trust has been almost destroyed by active radical actions on both sides. Over the past two years, the state has treated the UOC as an “enemy” of Ukraine, trying to achieve its goals only through pressure and threats. Radical actions of the OCU toward the UOC intensified the confrontation. The state demonstratively supported one side of the inter-jurisdictional conflict. This was often done in violation of legislation at various levels of state administration. For its part, the UOC, within its community and in the international arena, promoted an image of the Ukrainian state as godless, one that grossly violates international laws and initiates “persecution” of a religious community “innocent of anything.”
It is also worth noting that in recent months we have heard from certain representatives of the authorities and the expert academic community some change in rhetoric regarding the UOC and its future. The emphasis is no longer placed on pushing the UOC toward unity with the OCU, which the former very much does not want, but rather the option of direct subordination of the UOC to the Ecumenical Patriarchate is being proposed. Thus, the adviser to the deputy head of the Office of the President, the well-known scholar of religion Vita Tytarenko, in her report at the round table “Dialogue of the Church, the State, and Society: Paths to Understanding,” stated that “for the UOC, the possibility of changing subordination from the ROC to the Ecumenical Patriarchate is open.” In particular, she emphasized:
“Which path the UOC chooses lies within its zone of responsibility. This may be the preservation of activity in the status of a Ukrainian community without subordination to the ROC, accession to the OCU, or an appeal under the omophorion of the Ecumenical Patriarch — both by entire parishes and by individual communities of faithful. Or to choose another canonical model for itself.”
In answers to questions, Ms. Vita directly stated that the state supports the possibility of obtaining for the UOC an exarchate from the Ecumenical Patriarch.
In her speech at the forum “Resilient Europe: Forum on Countering Russian Disinformation and Propaganda,” which took place on December 7–18, 2025, in Brussels, on the premises of the European Economic and Social Committee, Ms. Vita Tytarenko repeated the claim about the possibility of the UOC’s transfer under the omophorion of the Ecumenical Patriarch:
“It (the state) gave the UOC a choice: please, either you unite with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, or you go under the omophorion of the Ecumenical Patriarch, or you remain in the status of unregistered communities.”
Such an option — an exarchate under the Ecumenical Patriarchate — had not previously been offered to the UOC. Despite strong opposition to this idea from the OCU, it can be cautiously stated that the state is ready to support dialogue between the UOC and the Ecumenical Patriarch in order to discuss precisely this way out of the crisis. The main question is: “Will the UOC use this chance to normalize its canonical status and completely detach from the ROC?” If Metropolitan Onufrii, with the support of a pro-Ukrainian majority among the bishops, dares to take such a step, then there is hope to obtain from Patriarch Bartholomew the maximum possible status for the UOC — autonomy. If, however, the leadership of the Church ignores this attempt, then we may expect an appeal from the clergy, possibly from two or three UOC bishops, to Patriarch Bartholomew with a request to approve the creation of separate stauropegial parishes or an exarchate. As we know, a certain number of parishes are already ready to address the Ecumenical Patriarch with such a request. There is a strong conviction that with the support of the state, Patriarch Bartholomew will satisfy such a request. If the possibility is created for parishes to transfer under the omophorion of the Phanar, this will cause a sharp outflow of UOC parishes and the gradual destruction of the even conditional unity of the UOC so longed for by many. Thus, Metropolitan Onufrii stands before a choice: either to enter into dialogue with the Phanar and try to preserve the unity of the majority of the UOC within the framework of autonomy under the Ecumenical Patriarchate, or to do nothing and gradually lose the entire Church.
The Third Force. Dialogue Initiatives. The Sophia Brotherhood
Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, which began back in 2014, became an impetus for the activation of civil society and for the formation of communities grounded in the principles of conciliarity, justice, and responsibility. These processes did not bypass the religious environment either. In 2018, the young Ukrainian Church emerged. And although the process of its creation was not without major political games, an important element in the process of creating and building the OCU was grassroots movements of clergy and faithful. One such movement was the “Group of 10 Theses.” The participants of the Group put forward 10 points for discussion and improvement of church life. Emphasis was placed on establishing genuine conciliarity, renewing parish life, greater involvement of the faithful in Church affairs, high-quality translation of liturgical texts, a “new evangelization,” abandoning the old paradigm of church–state relations, strengthening transparency and accountability, the Church’s social service, reforming church education, and fostering dialogical openness.
An interesting grassroots initiative was also launched within the UOC environment. At the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, in the spring of 2022, the Signatories’ Movement arose. The well-known priest Andrii Pinchuk published an appeal to the Higher Church Court — the Pentarchy, in which he asked it to consider the heretical teaching and anti-Christian actions of Patriarch Kirill (Gundyaev). More than 400 UOC priests from all over Ukraine signed this open appeal. During the period 2022–2024, participants of the movement carried out active informational work within the UOC, repeatedly appealed to their leadership, demanding a break in ties with the ROC and the restoration of Eucharistic communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and other Local Churches. Under pressure from the movement’s participants and a large number of clergy from various dioceses, the leadership of the UOC convened the Council in Theophany in May 2022, at which significant steps were taken toward making the UOC independent from the ROC.
One area of the Signatories’ Movement activity was establishing dialogue with grassroots clergy and faithful of the OCU. The grassroots movement of UOC representatives found points of contact with the grassroots movement of the “Group of 10 Theses” for the OCU. The result of several joint meetings at Saint Sophia of Kyiv was the creation of a number of important documents and statements, such as, for example, the Declaration of Understanding, published on July 5, 2022.
In these documents, mutual recognition of each other’s sacraments was voiced, and forceful seizures of churches were condemned.
Systematic contacts between the clergy and faithful of both churches led to a certain institutionalization of dialogue initiatives. In April 2024, the public organization “Sophia Brotherhood” was established, bringing together well-known priests of both churches, theologians, journalists, and intellectuals not only from Ukraine but also from abroad. The Sophia Brotherhood became a real movement of Orthodox Christians in Ukraine, aimed at healing the institutional crisis of church communities, restoring Eucharistic communion, and developing open Orthodoxy. The main goal of the Brotherhood is comprehensive promotion of inter-Orthodox dialogue in order to achieve the unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, to unite efforts and support initiatives of Orthodox Christians aimed at its development.
Over nearly two years of the organization’s existence, its activities have become known both in Ukraine and beyond its borders. The unique—and almost the only—experience in Ukraine of dialogue, communication, and cooperation between representatives of two warring churches has become evidence of existing possibilities to find understanding within Ukraine’s church environment. The current inter-jurisdictional and church–state relations in Ukraine cannot develop without taking this remarkable experience into account. The Sophia Brotherhood initiated and actively supports a process of dialogue with various subjects of the church crisis in Ukraine: Orthodox churches, the state, and civil society. This gives all of us hope to achieve understanding and unite for the sake of the Church’s saving mission and the defense of Ukraine from a cruel enemy.